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Preface
Equality is one of those things which no good man could ever
oppose. Call it mediocrity and the magic is lost.
Equality mostly exists in its negative form: inequality. We speak
of a reduction of inequality rather than of an expansion of equal-
ity, suggesting that equality is something in which our society is
necessarily lacking.
One can reduce inequality by transferring something from those
who have more to those who have less. Sometimes, this can
be done without a cost in terms of averages, but that does not
mean that it is a Pareto improvement.
Common arguments for income redistribution do not necessar-
ily hold when considering education. Furthermore, the lack of
a good cardinal measure of educational achievement makes it
harder to define efficiency. Inequality in educational outcomes
is therefore not unambiguously bad, particularly when framed
as the choice between a drive for excellence and a drive for medi-
ocrity.
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This thesis is centered around tracking, an educational pol-
icy which probably increases differences between children while
keeping the median relatively unaffected. Tracking is hard to
defend when framed as detrimental to equality, but it is also a
guard against mediocrity – an effect which may extend to the
years before its start.
I am intellectually indebted to Denny Borsboom, Angela Djup-
sjo¨backa, Fabian Pfeffer, Anders Stenberg and many others. I
also specifically want to thank my adviser Markus Ja¨ntti, the
two external examiners Roope Uusitalo and John Micklewright,
custos Johan Willner and opponent Oskar Nordstro¨m Skans.
I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Yrjo¨ Jahnssonin
sa¨a¨tio¨, Stiftelsens fo¨r A˚bo Akademi forskningsinstitut, Bro¨derna
Lars och Ernst Krogius forskningsfond, Jubileumsfonden and
from the Academy of Finland.
Parts of this thesis were written at the Swedish Institute for
Social Research. I appreciate the patience you have shown with
me.
Kristian Koerselman
Helsinki, 2011
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The original question underlying this thesis concerns the effects
of a particular educational policy: curriculum tracking. Cur-
riculum tracking is the practice of stratifying students into ed-
ucational tracks according to ability or achievement. Students
usually follow a common comprehensive program up to a cer-
tain age, after which they are split up. The age at which the
students are split varies from 9 or 10 years in some countries, to
16 or arguably 19 years in others.
Many authors have looked at curriculum tracking. Surveying the
earlier literature, it is probable that tracking has larger (if such
things can be compared) and more certain effects on the inequal-
ity of educational outcomes than on their average level. This
is related to the literature on peer effects, where the achieve-
ment of any student depends positively on the achievement of
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classmates. Tracking explicitly affects class composition, mak-
ing classes more homogeneous and diminishing the magnitude
of inequality-reducing peer effects.
The track chosen or selected into plays an important role in
determining educational achievement and attainment and hence
also occupation and earnings. Not only do higher tracks give
access to better peer groups, it is often hard to change tracks at
a later age. Once the student enters a lower track, the door to
higher education may be all but closed.
Tracking should also be expected to have an effect on achieve-
ment before the start of tracking. Students, parents, teachers
and principals know that the start of tracking is an important
point in the student’s educational and professional career. The
students have an incentive to work harder before the tracking
point, and parents, teachers and principals are likely to push
them to do so.
Additionally, there is an incentive to substitute effort in non-
tested subjects and proficiencies towards tested ones, crowding
out non-tested subjects. Also, early tracking policies may be
correlated with a more general competition-oriented educational
system, perhaps also exposing students to tests at an earlier age.
For all these reasons, we should expect higher early age test
scores in countries and regions that track early. One contribu-
tion of this thesis to the literature is to make a comprehensive
empirical investigation of such incentive effects of tracking. I find
evidence for incentive effects in both British and international
data, at 0.09 UK standard deviations and 0.23 international
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standard deviations respectively. The British estimate appears
well-identified, and probably largely reflects the causal effect of
tracking on early test scores. The international estimate should
not be interpreted causally, as it probably reflects both a direct
causal effect, and the effects of culture and institutions on both
tracking policies and early test scores. The correlation is how-
ever remarkable, illustrating a strong connection between early
tracking and early test scores. These findings can be placed in
a larger literature that shows that students do indeed tend to
respond to incentives.
I also look for incentive effects in the Swedish comprehensive
school reform of the 1950s and 1960s. However, too many as-
pects of educational policy were changed at the same time, and
it is hard to draw any substantive conclusions. Both positive
and negative incentive effects are consistent with the data un-
der different assumptions.
The existence of incentive effects is interesting in and of itself.
How much competitive pressure students should be subject to
at different ages is a matter under debate. Incentive effects
have methodological implications as well. If pre-tracking scores
are endogenous, we cannot use them to control for unobserved
variables.
The second main contribution of this thesis is methodological.
How well can we actually measure educational achievement?
Economists use cognitive, noncognitive and achievement test
scores as well as grades as if the numbers had cardinal meaning.
In truth, we can only measure them at an ordinal level. This
3
makes the use of test score means, for example in mean-based
regression such as OLS, questionable.
Fortunately, mean-based results seem to approximate underly-
ing learning quite well, at least in an economic context and in
well-behaved data. Nevertheless, economists should be aware of
how test scores are constructed.
Both topics are highly relevant today. Tracking is a much de-
bated policy in countries that still track early, such as for exam-
ple Germany. At the same time, schools in late tracking coun-
tries such as Sweden are in danger of becoming more unequal
through the introduction of voucher schools and other market
based reforms. Tracking may be a viable meritocratic alterna-
tive to other forms of segregation.
The methodology behind educational achievement scores is more
important now than ever. The public debate on education has
become centered on educational achievement scores from inter-
national surveys such as PISA and TIMSS. It is important to
know how these scores are produced, and what conclusions we
can and cannot draw from them.
This thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2, I go through
some basic tools and concepts to analyze educational policy.
In chapter 3 I explain why educational test scores are funda-
mentally measured at an ordinal level, and try to quantify how
problematic this is in empirical work. In chapter 4, I go through
the different forms of curriculum tracking, and selectively sum-
marize the empirical literature on tracking. In chapter 5, I look
at the incentive effects of tracking. Chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Tools and frameworks
2.1 The simplest possible framework
Following Hartog (2001), we can begin with “the simplest pos-
sible framework” to describe the educational process and subse-
quent labor market success.
s = Ea
y = pTQs
The educational production matrix E maps a vectors of abilities
a into a vector of educational achievement or skills s. Skills are
then mapped into wages y by subsequently multiplying skills by
the productivity matrix Q and by a transposed vector of labor
market prices pT. Policy is understood to change E or pTQ, and
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abilities to include educational inputs like parental ‘quality’.
Throughout this thesis, I will assume that achievement has no
value other than its effects on later outcomes. Wages are one
(imperfect) measure of these later outcomes, but others are cer-
tainly possible.
There are two reasons for concentrating on later outcomes. On
the one hand, I argue that viewing education as a means rather
than an end fits the economic interpretation of education as
an investment in personal productive capacity. This concept is
called human capital, a set of skills and norms which increase
productivity.
The concept of human capital was explored by William Petty as
early as 1691, and has subsequently been studied by, among oth-
ers, Smith, Engel, Walras and Fisher (Kiker 1968), with the most
influential work on the subject probably being that of Schultz
(1961), Becker (1964/1993) and Mincer (1974).
On the other hand, I argue that economic growth is one of the
main concerns of policy makers. Even if it can be argued that
the two reforms covered in this thesis were mainly redistributive
in nature, productivity arguments played an important role in
the internal and external debates preceding the reforms.
Due to data limitations, it is often impossible to estimate the ef-
fect of educational policy on wages directly.1 Instead we have to
contend ourselves with separate estimates of the two equations
in the model. In the first step, we can for example look at the
1Among the exceptions are Meghir and Palme (2005) and Cunha et al.
(2010).
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effects of changing policy on s, and in the second at the effects
of s on y.
There two potential issues with this approach. One is that policy
can have effects on wages (or other outcomes) that are not medi-
ated by measured achievement s. To some degree this problem
can be ameliorated by testing achievement more broadly and
thoroughly. To another we will have to accept the limitations
that the data impose on us.
Another issue is that, depending on definitions, achievement is
either an ordinal variable, or a cardinal variable which only can
be measured ordinally. I will go through the implications of the
ordinality of test scores further below.
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2.2 Mapping achievement to wages
The mapping of educational achievement into wage outcomes
has been investigated exhaustively. I summarize the literature in
order to more easily evaluate changes in test scores in subsequent
chapters.
On the micro level, the amount education that the individual
chooses is usually modeled as an investment decision. Suppose
that human capital loses all value at the end of the working life,
but that it does not depreciate before that. Given a set of conve-
nient other assumptions, it would be optimal for the individual
to spend some part of his working life in education and the rest
at work. The optimal amount invested depends on the marginal
cost of education, an important part of which is the opportu-
nity cost of not working, and the marginal discounted benefit of
higher productivity later in life. Of course, since the persistent
stream of education induced benefits only materializes after its
competion, it pays to allocate all educational expenditures to
the beginning of one’s life.
We can estimate micro level returns to personal investment in
human capital with a Mincerian wage equation, for example
ln y = α+ βt+ γx+ δx2 + ε
where y are annual earnings, t denotes years of education and
x years of labor market experience. The coefficient β is often
interpreted as an approximation of the internal rate of return to
education. In his 1974 book, Mincer estimates this particular
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wage equation to be
ln y = 6.20 + 0.11t+ 0.08x− 0.01x2 + ε
for white US men working in outside of the agricultural sector in
1959, implying that the rate of return of education for this group
is about 11% (Mincer 1974). Newer studies with larger numbers
of controls find estimates in the 6%–9% range (Ashenfelter et
al. 1999).
It should be noted that the outcome of the educational produc-
tion function is usually achievement, while a Mincerian wage
equation is a function of the quantity of education. Achievement
and quantity of education differ in two ways. First, quantity of
education is an input measure while achievement is an output
measure. Second, the quantity of education should be adjusted
for quality. Some authors derive quality-adjusted measures of
the quantity of education, but there is also a literature on the
effects of changes in achievement on wages (e.g. Murnane et
al. 2000, Altonji and Pierret 2001, Galindo-Rueda 2003, Lazear
2003, Speakman and Welch 2006, Hanushek and Zhang 2009).
The Mincerian wage equation is potentially problematic as a
method to estimate returns. The highly educated may have
higher unobserved abilities, which make them choose higher lev-
els of education as well as contributing to their wages. This will
bias the estimate of β upward. On the other hand, compara-
tive advantages will bias estimates downward because without
education, the highly educated would have made less than their
peers, not more. Measurement error in educational attainment
9
will bias estimates downward as well.
Angrist and Krueger (1991) make an attempt to remove this
bias by using natural variation in birth dates as an instrument
for schooling: children born early in the calendar year have
shorter schooling durations because compulsory schooling laws
keep their younger peers in school longer. These IV results are
not much larger than the regular, OLS results, suggesting that
we can use normal Mincerian wage equations to approximate
the true return to education. In fact, comparing 96 estimates
from 27 studies, Ashenfelter et al. (1999) find surprisingly small
differences between estimates from studies using all variation,
studies using exogenous variation only, and twin studies.
A different interpretation is that both kinds of estimates are
overestimates of the average return to schooling. Where OLS
estimates under certain assumptions give an average effect for
everyone, IV estimates only give an average effect for the ‘switch-
ers’ who change their behavior because of the instrument. Be-
cause many of the instruments of choice mainly affect the dis-
advantaged, and because there is reason to believe that returns
to schooling are larger for the more disadvantaged (Krueger and
Lindahl 2001), this will inflate the IV estimates compared to the
average causal effect.
Using a combination of instruments, it is possible to estimate
marginal treatment effects at different parts of the distribu-
tion. Carneiro et al. (2005, 2010) do this, and estimate the
shape of the distribution of the marginal returns to college at-
tendance. They find decreasing, not increasing returns to college
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for marginal college students, suggesting that average returns
are higher.
Microeconomic estimates such as Mincerian wage equations esti-
mate the private returns to education, but are uninformative of
macro-level social gains or losses. In the typical OECD country,
around 6% of GDP is used for formal education, five sixths of
which comes from public sources (OECD 2010a, 2010b). How
can such large subsidies be motivated?
There may be many different kinds of positive externalities as-
sociated with education. Milton Fiedman (1962, chapter VI)
for example mentions stability and democracy, but believes that
these externalities mainly arise from specific kinds of education.
Thus we should be more willing to subsidize elementary schools
and liberal arts colleges than vocational programs. Vocational
education merely increases productivity, and individuals should
be able to demand optimal amounts of it by themselves.
We may also think that education lowers crime rates and raises
public health (Hartog and Van den Brink 2007, ch. 5) as well as
labor market participation rates. There may be externalities in
the invention and spread of new technologies, and of productiv-
ity in general.
On the other hand, education may have negative externalities as
well. Perhaps education does not have an effect on productivity
at all. In a world where education affects relative wages, but
leaves average wages unaltered, the negative effect that any in-
dividual’s education thus has on the wages of others can be seen
as an externality. In such a world we would however observe a
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positive regression coefficient in a Mincerian wage equation.
Suppose for example that employers cannot perfectly observe
employee quality. If only highly competent employees can prof-
itably signal their competence by obtaining costly advanced ed-
ucational degrees, employers may be willing to offer higher wages
to the educated, even when education adds nothing to that com-
petence (Spence 1973). In such a setting, everyone would be
better off if the general level of education were lowered while
preserving its signaling value. Consequently society should try
to discourage education rather than subsidize it.
Spence also points to relatively immutable but observable char-
acteristics like sex or race, which can interact with the signaling
variable. Some groups may be in one equilibrium while others
are in another. Separate equilibria can exist because employers
can observe the immutable characteristic. An employer may for
example see a (lack of) education as a signal for men, but not
for women.2 This in turn removes the incentive for the women
to educate themselves, sustaining the equilibrium.
Stiglitz (1975) compares pooling and separating signaling equi-
libria.3 In the baseline case, education is costly, but both equi-
libria exist. Just like in Spence, society can get stuck in the
suboptimal separating equilibrium where low quality workers
have low wages, and high quality workers have to go through
2Or perhaps the other way around.
3Stiglitz speaks of ‘screening’, which is more of an objective assessment
than the self-selective ‘signaling’. However, in the context of education,
they amount to largely the same thing. If we abstract educational degrees
to a pass/fail indicator, and individuals are aware of their own abilities,
they will choose a screening test which they are just able to pass, thus
signaling their ability.
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costly education in order not to be confused with low quality
workers. Stiglitz then goes on to explore scenarios where sig-
naling instruments can in fact yield gains to society. Among
the examples are worker-job matching in case of comparative
advantages, and the emergence of less efficient signaling devices
in lieu of the current system.
Lange (2007) looks at wage dynamics in the National Longitudi-
nal Survey of Youth. The result of the AFQT, a cognitive skills
test, is available to the researcher, but not to the respondents’
employers. Lange uses this to calculate the rate of employer
learning about employee productivity. He is then able to put
an upper bound of 25% on the signaling share of the returns to
education.
Do the positive externalities of education outweigh the negative
ones? There is some microeconomic evidence to support posi-
tive externalities. For example, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)
and Moretti (2004) find positive monetary external effects of a
magnitude smaller than the private returns. On the macroeco-
nomic level the evidence is rather weak (Krueger and Lindahl
2001, cf. Topel 1999).
Externalities per se seem to be an insufficient reason for the
extensive government subsidies for education. A stronger ar-
gument can perhaps be found in concerns over the education of
particular groups. Children of the lower classes may underinvest
in education in a fully private system, either because of credit
constraints, or because of cultural factors.
All these arguments regard the optimality of investment deci-
13
sions from an individual perspective. Apart from ensuring ef-
ficiency, educational policy can however also be used for social
policy. Indeed, ‘social’ arguments for the large increase in public
investments in education during the 20th century played as large
a role as ‘economical’ ones at the time. An educational system
can produce aggregate outcomes that society values, even if the
size and allocation of educational investments can be inefficient
from an individual perspective.
14
Chapter 3
Admissible statistics
Measures of educational outcomes are ordinal. In theory, any
monotonic transformation of a test score distribution is also a
valid distribution. One illustration of this fact can be found in
figure 3.1, where I have collected histograms of nine test score
distributions.
The distributions differ in skew, but this is not informative of
skew in underlying achievement. In fact, we could administer
two tests designed to measure the same achievement dimension
to the same students, and obtain score distributions with differ-
ent shapes.
When mapping test scores into wages, as in section 2.2, we can
be pragmatic about this problem. Whatever the distribution of
test scores we have, we can adapt the functional form of our
model to make it fit the data. Whatever the true meaning of
15
PISA US math PISA UK math PISA Belgium math
NCDS UK reading age 7 NCDS UK reading age 16 NCDS UK math age 16
AFQT US age 16 AFQT US age 19 AFQT US age 22
Figure 3.1: Test score distributions. Top row: cohort-representative
weighted country score distributions for PISA 2006 math scores (OECD
2006). Middle row: reading and math scores for the NCDS (University
of London 2008). Bottom row: weighted AFQT scores derived from the
ASVAB administered to the NLSY79 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010)
sample.
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test scores, we can estimate the effect of a marginally higher
score in any part of the test score distribution.
The first step in the framework on page 5 is more problematic. It
describes the link between ability, background variables and pol-
icy on achievement and skills. This link is commonly estimated
by regressing measures of ability or achievement on covariates,
for example to evaluate educational policies or teacher perfor-
mance (cf. Lazear 2003, Todd and Wolpin 2003, Hanushek 2006).
A positive and monotonic transformation of test scores contains
the same ordinal information as the original variable, but regres-
sion coefficients can change depending on if we use the original
or the transformed variable. In extreme cases, coefficients can
change sign.
The ordinality of test scores has not stopped economists from us-
ing and interpreting them as if they were cardinal. In this chap-
ter, I summarize the psychometric theories behind test scores,
and investigate how large robustness problems are in reality.
I find that the ordinality of test scores is not a large problem
when treatment effects are homogeneous, or when we can also
observe later outcomes to anchor the test scores to. Often, nei-
ther of these conditions are satisfied, and robustness problems
can be large for arbitrary transformations of the test scores.
As economists, we can however interpret test scores as a measure
of human capital, and restrict the set of transformations to those
yielding distributions of human capital we deem reasonable. I
estimate an empirical distribution of human capital, and show
that normally distributed test scores are a close enough proxy for
17
underlying human capital for regression results to be relatively
robust.
More skewed or irregular score distributions, such as those in
the bottom two rows of Figure 3.1 may have to be transformed
before use. We should also keep in mind that it is uninforma-
tive to report regression coefficients in test score points, and
use standard deviations, percentile ranks or correspondent later
outcomes instead.
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3.1 Psychometric theory
Psychometricians have a long tradition of linking appropriate
statistical methods to different kinds of data. A key insight is
that all data are in essence mappings of empirical phenomena
onto some scale or another, and that the choice of scale is to a
certain degree arbitrary.
We want our statements to be qualitatively robust to changes in
the mapping from the empirical world onto the data scale. For
example, we do not want our qualitative conclusions to change
when we map height into meters instead of feet. A comparison
of mean heights of adult men in England and France should yield
the same qualitative result as to which nation is the tallest in ei-
ther case. Comparing mean height is indeed robust as the empir-
ically taller nation will always have the larger mean height. By
contrast, conclusions based on the mean of an ordinal variable
are not robust to the choice of scale. Consider highest completed
education. Using 1 for primary education, 2 for upper secondary
education and 3 for tertiary education may or may not give a
different ordering of the English and French means compared to
using 9 for tertiary education instead of 3, even if (1, 2, 9) is just
as good a representation of the ordinal levels as is (1, 2, 3).
Stevens (1946) suggests a relatively easy way to determine when
we will run into robustness problems of the above kind. We
group scales into four levels: nominal, ordinal, interval and ra-
tio, as can be seen from Table 3.1. We call a certain statistic
admissible for a level of scale when empirical conclusions derived
from it are robust to the use different scales within the level.
19
Scale Mapping Examples of Examples of
variables admissible
statistics
Ratio x′ = ax income, coefficient of
(highest) age variation
Interval x′ = ax+ b school grade mean,
(i.e. year), variance
calendar date
Ordinal x′ = f(x), level of education, median,
f() monotonically socioeconomic other quantiles
increasing background
Nominal x′ = f(x), gender, mode
(lowest) f() gives a race,
one-to-one religion
relationship
Table 3.1: Admissible statistics for four different measurement levels,
adapted from Stevens (1946). Each measurement level inherits the ad-
missible statistics from the levels below.
Statistics are always admissible on higher level scales than their
own, and inadmissible on lower levels.
A related but distinct problem is that of meaningfulness. We
calculate statistics on our data in order to learn something about
the real, empirical world. Statements on the data which bear no
relationship to the empirical world, are therefore not empirically
meaningful (cf. Hand 2004, section 2.4.1). A statement like“The
mean completed education in England is 1.8.” makes no sense
because it is not a statement on education in England as much
as on the mean of a vector of arbitrary numbers stored on our
computer.
Meaningfulness and admissibility usually coincide, but there
may be situations in which they do not (cf. Lord 1953, Zand
20
Scholten and Borsboom 2009). We could for example compare
mean education in England and France, and conclude that they
are significantly different : that the English and French samples
are not likely to have been drawn from the same population.
The existence of a difference of the calculated means is depen-
dent on the coding of the variable, and thus not robust, nor is
the mean the best way to quantify this difference, but the con-
clusion that the religious composition of the two countries differ
is meaningful nevertheless.
Test scores are used as a measure of a variety of concepts. They
are designed to capture variables like intelligence or ability, pro-
ficiency at a certain task, or learning. Below, I will refer to the
underlying variable as ‘achievement’ even though the reasoning
applies to other variables just as well.
Achievement cannot be observed directly, but must be estimated
using some kind of framework. These can be divided into two
broad categories.
The simpler of the two is called Classical test theory or CTT. In
CTT, the test score is a linear transformation of the proportion
of test items or questions answered correctly. This is the kind
of scoring we perhaps remember from our own time in school.
CTT is based on a true score model
x = t+ ε
where t is the true, underlying probability of the student an-
swering questions correctly, and x is the observed proportion of
questions actually answered correctly. The error ε arises because
21
the number of questions is limited, adding noise to the estimate.
We use x as the estimate of t.
Test scores calculated using CTT are straightforward to inter-
pret. The scores are estimates of the proportion of questions
a student would be expected to answer correctly when given a
similar test. Group averages of CTT scores also have a clear
interpretation: they are the proportion of questions the group
as a whole would be expected to answer correctly. We could
thus conclude that CTT scores are of ratio level, and we would
be right to do so, if there were just one possible relevant test.
The advantage of CTT is however at the same time its disad-
vantage. CTT provides a score given a particular level of ques-
tions. The score distance between two students is determined
by the level of questions considered. If the questions are very
hard, almost no question will be answered correctly, student
scores will be massed against the lower 0% bound, and conse-
quently, the score distribution will have right skew (see Figure
3.2). Similarly, the score distribution will have left skew when
the questions are very easy. In the first case, the score distances
between low-scoring students become small, and between high-
scoring students they become large. The opposite happens in
the second case. (cf. Lord 1980, p. 50)
The difference in the skew of the score distribution affects our
estimated mean effects. If we were to compare means between
a treatment and a control group on the basis of the hard test,
we would weight the right tail of the distribution more heavily,
whereas if we were to compare means on the basis of the easy
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test, we would weight the left tail more.
We can interpret CTT scores on a ratio level when speaking
about a specific test. We could for example use a change in
achievement test scores to identify that the average probability
of answering correctly on a specific level of questions has in-
creased. We cannot, however, generalize the result to the scores
obtained by a different achievement test, even if both tests are
designed to measure the same underlying concept. Also, we can-
not make ratio-level statements on the effect on the underlying
concept itself. We cannot conclude that ‘mean achievement’ has
increased even if mean test scores have.
hard test easy test
Figure 3.2: Hard CTT tests produce a score distribution with right skew
while easy tests produce left skew.
An alternative to CTT is Item response theory, or IRT. IRT
simultaneously estimates student and question properties by fit-
ting an item response function which describes the probability of
giving a specific response or answer to the specific item or ques-
tion the function refers to. Often, the response categories are
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‘right’ and ‘wrong’, and we estimate an item response function
of the form
P(yij = 1) = cj +
1− cj
1 + e−aj(θi−bj)
This function is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
P(yij = 1) is the probability of student i answering question j
correctly, θi is the level of student achievement we are interested
in, and bj is overall question difficulty. The inflexion point of
the response function lies at bj = θi, and we say that student
achievement and question difficulty are equal at this point.
The limiting probability of answering the question correctly for
extremely low levels of achievement is given by cj . It can be in-
terpreted as the probability of answering correctly when making
an uninformed guess. The upper probability limit is assumed to
be one.
Question discrimination aj determines the rate at which stu-
dents get better at answering the question when they have a
higher level of achievement. A question which everyone answers
equally well has zero discrimination. aj may even turn negative
if answering correctly on question j correlates negatively with
answering correctly on the others. This may for example be the
case for trick questions. Questions with low or negative discrim-
ination are however regularly discarded from test databases.
There are model variations where one or more item parameters
are fixed or otherwise restricted, mainly because there is rela-
tively little information contained in each response. When c is
set to zero, and a to one, we obtain the commonly used Rasch
24
model. As is generally the case when c = 0, the inflexion point
bj = θi then lies at the level where the student is expected to
answer the question correctly with probability 0.5.
Figure 3.3: An item response function gives the probability of a student
answering a certain question correctly as a function of his achievement.
Question parameters a (discrimination), b (difficulty) and c (guessing) are
illustrated in the figure.
IRT models remove much of the CTT models’ dependence on
question difficulty. Score distances arise from the difficulty with
which students answer questions above and below their own
level. If a student is answering questions above his own level
of achievement with relative ease, the distance θi − bj must be
relatively close to zero, just as when he does not do unusually
well on questions below his level.
Because similar scores can be estimated for question sets of dif-
ferent difficulties, it would seem that IRT models solve the CTT
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models’ ordinality problem. Unfortunately it returns in a differ-
ent guise.
Unlike CTT-scores, IRT student scores are not anchored to some
absolute measure. We can for example add a constant to the vec-
tors θ and b and arrive at the same model fit. In the same way,
we could multiply θ and b with a constant and divide a by it.
The model is therefore unidentified if we do not impose addi-
tional restrictions on the scores, for example by specifying that
the sample mean score equals zero, and its standard deviation
one.
We can also change the higher moments of the distribution by
estimating a different functional form. The horizontal achieve-
ment and difficulty axis can for example be transformed by
θ∗ = k1ek2θ, where k1 and k2 are constants, so that both the item
response functions and the distribution of θ and b are stretched
out in one tail and compressed in the other (Lord 1980, p. 85),
lending the score distribution arbitrary skew.
While CTT distances are a product of the particular test taken,
IRT distances depend on the equations which we use to map raw
scores into test scores. In both cases, we can reasonably change
our methods, and obtain a test score which follows a different
distribution. We must conclude that test scores are measured
at an ordinal level, and that monotonic transformations of test
scores are just as valid scores.
To illustrate how such transformations of test scores can change
mean-based estimates, consider Figure 3.4. We compare a treat-
ment (dashed lines) and a control distribution. Treatment has
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a positive effect in the right tail, but a negative effect in the
left. In the original data (top), the positive effect outweighs the
negative, and the mean treatment effect is positive. In the nor-
malized version of the data however (bottom), the right tail is
given less weight, and the mean treatment effect turns negative.
The estimated treatment effect is not robust to a monotonic
transformation of the test scores.
As can be seen from Figure 3.5, ordinal methods such as quantile
regression are qualitatively robust in the sense that for each
quantile, the estimated effect has the same sign both in the true
and in the normalized distribution.
The ordinality of test scores is most elegantly handled by us-
ing statistics of the ordinal level. A statement like ‘the median
student in the treatment distribution has higher achievement
than the median student in the control distribution’ needs no
cardinal interpretation, and quantile-based methods are quali-
tatively robust. Psychometric theory would discourage us from
using mean-based analysis as it is based on information we can-
not actually measure.
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quantiles
0.005 0.5 0.84 0.995
quantiles
0.005 0.16 0.5 0.84 0.995
Figure 3.4: If the true distribution (top) differs from the imposed one (bot-
tom), this may lead to qualitatively wrong conclusions when comparing
distribution means. In this case, the treatment distribution (dashed lines)
has a higher mean in the true data, but appears to have a lower mean after
normalization.
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Figure 3.5: Quantile-based methods are qualitatively robust, with a neg-
ative effect on all quantiles below about 0.6, and a positive effect on all
quantiles above for the treatment effect from Figure 3.4.
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3.2 Economic practice
Due to the problems outlined in section 2.1, it is common prac-
tice in the economics of education literature to regress test scores
themselves on other variables (cf. Lazear 2003, Todd and Wolpin
2003, Hanushek 2006). As most regression techniques (such as
OLS) are mean based, this raises questions both of interpreta-
tion and of robustness.
Quantitative statements like “mean achievement has increased
by 11 points” are hard to interpret because there may not exist
such an empirical concept as mean achievement. Is it as mean-
ingless to compare means of achievement as it is to state that
the mean completed education in England is 1.8?
To a psychometrician, a comparison of mean test scores may in-
deed be meaningless. Comparisons of means are only meaningful
if achievement distances are comparable across the distribution:
is a ten point increase by one individual the same thing as a ten
point increase by another, in a different part of the distribution?
If achievement is truly ordinal, point distances are arbitrary, and
clearly not comparable.
The economist however, can interpret test scores as a measure of
human capital as per the framework in chapter 2 (e.g. Hanushek
2006, section 2). Human capital can be valued at market prices,
i.e. wages, and the price of human capital is clearly of ratio level.
A statement like “Adam has twice as much human capital as
Bert” is much less problematic than“Adam is twice as intelligent
as Bert.”
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Treating achievement as human capital also diminishes problems
of measurement. Of course, the existence of an underlying cardi-
nal concept of achievement does not mean that we can measure
it at that level. We can however use theory as well as empir-
ical information from other data sets to impose a distribution
onto the measured scores. This is something we are already do-
ing implicitly by treating the test scores we have as cardinal.
It seems that we could easily improve on this method by ex-
plicitly considering whether the cardinal information we use is
representative of underlying human capital.
The human capital interpretation of achievement also implies
that we do not need to account for robustness to arbitrary mono-
tonic transformations, but only to transformations that yield
reasonable human capital distributions.
Which possible underlying distributions would seem reasonable?
The normal distribution stands out as a natural candidate. It
has theoretical appeal as it emerges from an addition of many
independent draws from an arbitrary, finite distribution per the
central limit theorem. If we think of learning as an additive
random process, where each day’s new learning is a random draw
to be added to the existing stock, achievement will be normal.
A second appealing distribution is the the lognormal. It has a
similar relationship to the central limit theorem as the normal:
if we multiply rather than add the (positive) draws, we will end
up with a lognormal distribution. We can think of learning as a
process in which students start from the same baseline, and learn
at small, random rates each day, finally arriving at their test-
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day achievement level. The drawing of learning rates rather than
amounts implies that we think that past and future learning is
correlated on an absolute level, so that higher achieving students
are expected to acquire more additional knowledge in the future
than their peers.
There are other reasons which make the lognormal distribution
appealing. Even if learning would be additive in principle, the
achievement distribution will have right skew if high ability indi-
viduals also put more effort, time or other resources into learning
(cf. Becker 1964/1993, p. 100).
The standard assumption in the economics of education litera-
ture is that test scores map exponentially into wage income (cf.
Lazear 2003, Hanushek 2006, Cunha et al. 2010). Given that
test scores are often normally distributed, this implies that the
distribution of human capital is lognormal when measured in
wages.
Suppose that we regress normally distributed test scores, would
results be very different if we were to use a lognormal human
capital distribution instead? To try to answer this question,
I compare regression results between using normal test scores,
and their lognormally distributed empirical monetary value. In
order to make the difference between the two distributions as
large as reasonably possible, I try to arrive at an overestimate
of the true return to achievement
I use the UK National Child Development Study (NCDS 2008).
I select males who are full-time employed at age 48, and calculate
the principal component of their normalized age 11 and 16 test
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Figure 3.6: Average logged gross wages of 48-year old full-time employed
males for different achievement levels (circles, circle area and color is pro-
portionate to the number of observations) and the regression line through
the unaveraged data. Data: NCDS 2008.
scores. The use of a wage measure at a relatively old age should
increase the size of the estimate because the impact of test scores
should rise with age (Altonji and Pierret 2001, Galindo-Rueda
2003, Lange 2007).
Figure 3.6 shows average logged age 48 gross wages for different
achievement intervals at age 11 and 16 (circles). In line with
the economic literature, there is indeed an approximately linear
relationship between test scores and logged wages, which implies
an exponential mapping from scores to wages.
Part of the relationship between achievement and wages is due to
selection, and part is due to the causal effect of achievement on
wages. We can explore this relationship by estimating variations
of
lnw = a+ by +Xc+ ε
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where w are wages, y is the first principal component of either
age 11 or age 16 normalized achievement scores, and X is a
matrix containing control variables.
Because y is a noisy measure of underlying achievement, this
kind of specification will create an attenuated estimate of the
true relationship between achievement and wages. Luckily we
have multiple measures of achievement for both ages. Under
the assumption that the measurement error is white noise, it
is possible to correct for this bias by rescaling the measures
with their respective reliability ratios of the measure in each
specification (cf. Griliches 1986).
The reliability ratio is given by the ratio of the variance of the
latent variable or signal to the variance of the measure:
σ2signal
σ2signal + σ
2
noise
.
It can be estimated by comparing measures of the underlying
variable with other measures of the same variable. For example,
if they are perfectly correlated, the reliability ratio is one. If
they are completely uncorrelated, it is zero.
I rescale the principal components so that the signal contained
in them has a standard deviation of one, and we can interpret
regression results as the increase in log wages associated with a
one standard deviation increase in underlying achievement.
I start by regressing log wages on achievement only. The esti-
mated values of b can be found in the first column of Table 3.2.
They are moderately large at wage differences of 0.21 logs for a
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dependent variable: log wage
(1) (2) (3)
controlling for measurement error:
age 11 score 0.215 0.189 0.134
age 16 score 0.235 0.212 0.156
not controlling for measurement error:
age 11 score 0.189 0.164 0.112
age 16 score 0.191 0.167 0.112
controls:
parental background yes yes
highest educational attainment yes
Table 3.2: Separate estimates of the relationship between either age 11
or age 16 standardized test scores and logged age 48 wages for full-time
employed males in the British 1958 cohort. Data: NCDS (2008).
one standard deviation increase in age 11 test scores, and 0.23
for age 16 scores.
In column (2) I add controls for socioeconomic background. I
arrive at an association between test scores and log wages of
0.19 for the age 11 achievement distribution and 0.21 for age 16.
Depending on what we want to condition the wage distribution
on, we can add more controls. Column (3) shows the estimates
when I control for (endogenous) educational attainment (stan-
dardized to ISCED levels) as well. This reduces the estimates
to 0.13 for age 11 and 0.16 for age 16.
Other authors have found estimates in the range of 0.00–0.20
for all three kinds of specifications, with higher values for the
US than for other countries (Murnane et al. 2000, Altonji and
Pierret 2001, Galindo-Rueda 2003, Lazear 2003, Speakman and
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Welch 2006, Hanushek and Woessmann 2009, Hanushek and
Zhang 2009). Compared to these, my estimates are indeed at
the high end of the range. As can be seen from the bottom six
estimates in the table, this is in part because I control for mea-
surement error in the test scores, but probably also because I
purposefully do not adequately control for selection and the use
of late-age wages.
The next step is to map the standardized score distribution y
into the estimated conditional wage distribution wˆ according to
wˆ = exp(aˆ+ bˆy)
The conditional wages wˆ will be distributed lognormally with
the distribution parameter σ equal to bˆ. The larger σ, the larger
the skew of the lognormal. For low values of σ, the conditional
wage distribution will look like the normal. The largest value
of b in Table 3.2 which we still might reasonably call causal
stands at 0.212 in column (2), even though the true causal effect
is probably smaller. The lognormal distribution we obtain by
setting σ equal to 0.212 can be seen from the right panel in
Figure 3.7.
Suppose that the true cardinal achievement distribution is given
by this conditional wage distribution, but that we use a normal
test score distribution for our analysis. How much will regression
results change?
To keep things simple, let us compare means between a treat-
ment (subscript t) and a control group (subscript 0). I will call
the difference between the two the treatment effect on the mean
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normalized achievement distribution, age 16 conditional wage distribution
Figure 3.7: The estimated wage distribution conditional on differences in
achievement levels, controlling for parental background. A one percentile
in the achievement distribution (left) is associated with a one percentile
increase in the age 48 wage distribution (right). Data: NCDS 2008.
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βµ. Suppose that the true distribution is lognormal, and given
by
Y ∼ LN(µ, σ2),
but that we measure normal data given by
y = ln(Y ) ∼ N(µ, σ2).
In order to catch only the effect of a change in the shape of the
distribution, and not the effect of a change in the scale, I will
compare the difference of means in the normal distribution with
the difference of logged means in the lognormal distribution.
This implies that the difference will be expressed in terms of the
normalized test scores.
The estimate of the difference between the means βµ is biased
by:
bias = (E[yt]− E[y0])− (ln(E[Yt])− ln(E[Y0])) .
In terms of the moments of the treatment and control distribu-
tions, this equals
bias = (µt − µ0)−
(
µt +
1
2
σ2t − µ0 −
1
2
σ20
)
=
1
2
(
σ20 − σ2t
)
.
Let us define βσ as the amount by which the treatment distri-
bution is wider than the control distribution. Note that βσ is
expressed in control group standard deviations.
σt = (1 + βσ)σ0
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Rewriting the earlier equation in terms of σ0 and βσ we then
get
bias = −σ20
(
βσ +
1
2
β2σ
)
.
This shows that the amount of bias generated by assuming a
normal distribution where the lognormal distribution is appro-
priate is independent of the treatment effect on the mean, but
dependent on the difference in variance between treatment and
control groups. A relatively larger variance in the treatment
group will lead to a negative bias in the estimate of the treat-
ment effect, and vice versa.
The independence of qualitative robustness of the means of the
distributions can be generalized. Davison and Sharma (1988)
show that mean differences between two normal distributions of
equal variance are indicative of mean differences in any mono-
tonic transformation of those distributions.
How large is the bias in practice? In many cases, variances are
more or less constant over treatment, and the bias will be close
to zero in accordance with Davison and Sharma. One example
where this is clearly not the case is curriculum tracking. Track-
ing almost certainly leads to larger differences between students.
We can thus use curriculum tracking as a kind of worst-case sce-
nario for educational policy analysis.
I have selected three recent empirical papers from the literature
on the subject from which to get empirical values for both βµ
and βσ. All three papers use approximately normally distributed
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test scores.
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) compare tracking policies be-
tween countries cross-sectionally on the basis of PISA/PIRLS
and TIMSS data. Pekkarinen et al. (2009a) investigate the effect
of the 1970s Finnish comprehensive school reform using panel
data, while Duflo et al. (2008) use a randomized trial in Kenya
to look at the effects of tracking. These are three quite dif-
ferent settings, and their respective results are not necessarily
generalizable across regions and times. It is therefore perhaps
not surprising that the three papers find significant effects on
the mean of different signs. Tracking is however associated with
larger differences between students in all three papers.
For Hanushek and Woessmann, I have taken the pooled esti-
mates from Tables 3 and 4 directly. For Pekkarinen et al. I use
the fourth column in Table 4 as well as the descriptive informa-
tion in Table 3 to approximate the standardized effects on mean
and standard deviation. For Duflo et al. I use the second column
in Table 2 for the effect on the mean directly, and the heteroge-
neous estimates in column 4 of the same table to approximate
the effect on the standard deviation. In all three papers, test
scores are approximately normally distributed.
The first column in Table 3.3 shows standardized estimated
treatment effects on the mean from these papers. The second
column contains the standardized effects on the distributions’
standard deviations. The third column contains the parameter
σ0, which determines the skew of the assumed underlying human
capital distribution. I assume the human capital distribution to
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Paper βµ βσ σ0 bias new βµ
Hanushek and Woessmann -0.179 0.101 0.212 -0.005 -0.174
Pekkarinen et al. -0.010 0.009 0.212 0.000 -0.009
Duflo et al. 0.175 0.042 0.212 -0.002 0.177
Table 3.3: Estimated treatment effects of curriculum from a number of
selected papers. The last column shows the treatment effect on the mean
under the assumed lognormal achievement distribution.
have a σ0 equal to the 0.212 estimated above.
The fourth column contains the size of the bias under the as-
sumption that the true distribution is lognormal, and the fifth
the updated mean treatment effect. The size of the bias is small:
not exceeding 0.005 of a standard deviation in test scores for any
of the papers. This is not enough to change the papers’ respec-
tive quantitative conclusions very much, and will certainly not
change the sign of the estimates.
The estimate bˆ underlying the conditional wage distribution used
for this analysis is probably an overestimate of the causal rela-
tionship between test scores and wages. Were we to use a smaller
value of bˆ, the corresponding biases would be smaller in size as
well.
In conclusion, we can see that even if the policy evaluated here
has considerable effects on the spread of the test score distribu-
tion, estimates of effect sizes vary very little whether we assume
that the latent trait is normally or lognormally distributed when
we give the lognormal distribution reasonable parameters.
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3.3 Discussion
In part driven by limited availability of data on later outcomes,
economists often regress test scores on policy, teacher and back-
ground variables. This is potentially problematic because test
scores are fundamentally ordinal measurements.
This chapter illustrates that normally distributed test scores are
a reasonable approximation of underlying human capital. In
cases where later outcomes are not available to the researcher,
the use of mean-based methods on normal test scores seems
reasonable.
This result does not necessarily generalize to more exotic test
score distributions. In cases where score distributions are irregu-
lar or skewed, like in the bottom two rows of Figure 3.1, we may
do better to normalize test scores before use, at least if we think
that our sample is reasonably representative of the population.
It should be remembered that while we cannot truly measure
the underlying variable on a higher level than the ordinal, the
measurements are not entirely void of cardinal information ei-
ther. If we estimate test scores with a procedure that is known
to yield a reasonable cardinal measure for the population, us-
ing the same procedure on a select sample of that population
will quite adequately recover the underlying cardinal variable
for that sample, even if it follows a very different distribution.
In either case, the researcher should be conscious that score
distances are dependent on the assumptions going into their es-
timation, and that the quality of his inference is dependent on
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the quality of these assumptions.
I advocate the use of methods such as quantile regression on test
scores, at the very least as a kind of robustness check. The bias
produced by using the wrong distribution of test scores increases
in the heterogeneity of the estimated effect. Those cases where
mean-based analysis is the least robust will thus also be the cases
where quantile regression will give the most interesting results,
worth reporting in and of themselves.
It is hard to compare the size of regression coefficients between
analyses that use different sets of test scores. If treatment leads
to a six point increase in one test, and a different treatment leads
to an eight point increase in a different test, it is impossible even
to guess which treatment has the larger effect without additional
information. One way to partly circumvent the problem is to
standardize test scores and use a metric relative to the sam-
ple standard deviation. This is done explicitly in international
surveys like PISA.
When standardizing test scores, e.g. when reporting effect sizes,
we should however keep in mind that measurement error in the
test scores will affect the standardization, even if the variable is
used as a dependent variable only. The effect size is attenuated
with the square root of the reliability ratio.
Consider for example a policy that has a one standard deviation
effect on underlying achievement. If we have a single measure of
that achievement with a (not unusually small) reliability ratio of
0.5, the measured effect on the standardized achievement mea-
sure will only be 0.7 standard deviations. Estimates based on
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a noisy standardized test score variable will thus be attenuated
relative to the underlying variable even if the test score is the
dependent variable in the analysis.
In my own empirical analyses below, I will use mean based meth-
ods on test scores, both out of necessity and out of conviction.
On the one hand, the methods I use have been developed for
comparing means, and quantile based estimators are not as
widely available. On the other, I make sure to consistently use
normal or normalized test scores. I also note that estimated
effects are reasonably homogeneous in each case. The effect on
the mean can therefore be seen as a good approximation of the
effect on the median.
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Chapter 4
Curriculum tracking
I now turn to actual educational policy evaluation. Before start-
ing with the main empirical contribution of this thesis however,
I summarize parts of the literature relevant to my work.
4.1 Peer effects
A student’s achievement is not only dependent on his own abil-
ity or socioeconomic background. Equally important for his
achievement are his classmates. The influences of other students
are usually called peer effects. In their simplest form, peer ef-
fects cause a student’s achievement to regress to the mean of his
classmates’ achievement.
Peer effects can work through various mechanisms which can
be hard to disentangle quantitatively. For example, peer effects
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may change student characteristics such as ambitions directly,
but may also work more indirectly through class culture and
teaching styles, or even more indirectly through interactions be-
tween parents and teachers or principals.
Direct peer effects are likely be more reflective or multiplicative
than more indirect ones, so that a positive shock to one mem-
ber of the peer group causes improvements in each of the other
members, and so on until a new equilibrium is reached.
The existence of peer effects suggest that one relatively straight-
forward way to change inequality in educational achievement is
to change class composition. As will become clear further below,
this is indeed the case.
In theory, peer effects can take many forms. In the standard,
linear model, the peer effect on each student is a linear function
of the average achievement of his peers. On either side of the
linear case are peer effects convex or concave in means. Where
there is no effect of sorting on average outcomes in the linear
case, convex peer effects imply that sorting is efficient, while
concave peer effects imply that it is inefficient.
In the bad apple and the shining light models, only the worst
respectively the best student matter for the peer effect. The
bad apple model implies that sorting is efficient, the shining
light model that it is inefficient.
In the boutique and focus models, peer homogeneity aids educa-
tional production. In the boutique model, it is important that
there are other students similar to each single student. In the
focus model, homogeneity is also good if the single student is
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not part of the homogeneous group, for example because teach-
ers respond badly to heterogeneous classes. The rainbow model
is the opposite of the focus model: students need other kinds of
students around them.
In the invidious comparison model, individuals care about their
rank, and are discouraged by peers who do better than them-
selves (and vice versa).
Model Description Sorting
efficient?
Linear Uniform positive effect of mean peer com-
position.
+
Convex Positive and increasing effect of mean peer
composition.
+
Concave Positive but decreasing effect of mean peer
composition.
–
Bad apple Only worst student matters. +
Shining light Only best student matters. –
Boutique Important that there are no isolated stu-
dents.
+
Focus Positive effect of class homogeneity. +
Rainbow Positive effect of class heterogeneity. +
Invidious
comparison
Relative ranking positive effect for single
student.
(?)
Table 4.1: Possible types of peer effects, loosely after Hoxby and Weingarth
(2005).
The peer effects model of Lazear (2001) is often used as a build-
ing block in larger models. In the Lazear model, students are
thought to have an individual probability to disrupt teaching
(1 − pi), either by causing disturbances or by asking questions
all other students already know the answer to. A class of size n
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is thus being educated at any given moment with probability
P =
n∏
i=1
pi
This particular functional form makes peer effects convex, and
grouping students efficient. If all classes are to have the same
size, it can easily be seen that the presence of stratified classes
will increase average achievement, as well as differences between
students. When allowing class size to differ, taking into account
a budget constraint, and solving for optimal class size, higher
tracks, with high values of p, should have bigger classes than
lower tracks. Groups of students with sufficiently low values of
p should be separated from other students, and put into large
classes where disturbances approach 100%.
Though the model is elegant, a number of objections should
be raised against this model. First, its results follow directly
from the assumed convexity of peer effects. Convex peer effects
are however not strongly supported by the empirical literature.
Moreover, even if the mechanism seems plausible at first sight,
it is assumed that individual values of pi are not themselves
affected by peers. If they are endogenous, peer effects may be
linear or concave nevertheless.
Empirical results on peer effects are mixed.
Hoxby (2000) estimates linear peer effects in a large sample of
panel data from about 3300 Texan schools by using naturally
occurring, unexpected year-to-year changes in class composition
as an exogenous source of variation. This results in an estimated
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positive peer effect of between 0.15 and 0.4 points for every one
point change in peers’ reading scores.
Ammermu¨ller and Pischke (2006) find that class placement within
primary schools are random within their sample and estimate a
peer effect of 0.11. They find little evidence that peer effects be
nonlinear.
Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) try to reject some of the peer effect
models discussed above. While their results are not conclusive,
they find evidence for a combination of linear peer effects and a
return to homogeneity as in the boutique and focus models.
Hoxby (2000) also estimates peer effects for gender and for dif-
ferent ethnic backgrounds. Interestingly enough, girls have a
positive peer effect on both boys’ and other girls’ math scores.
The effect is so large that it is unlikely to be caused by a
gender-neutral mechanism, i.e. by girls’ higher overall achieve-
ment alone. Probably, the benign effect of girl to boy ratio is
indirect, for example through class culture. There is some evi-
dence that stronger peer effects exist within ethnic groups.
Lavy and Schlosser (2007) use a similar method to estimate
gender-specific peer effects. Girls have a positive effect on their
peers, and the effect is stronger at higher proportions of girls.
The effect even exists for subjects where boys do better. A
questionnaire shows that the positive effect of girls is partly due
to an improved in-class learning environment.
Lavy et al. (2009) find that peer effects mainly originate in
the top and bottom 5% of students, and that it is ability, not
parental background, that causes the peer effect. Top students
49
have a positive effect on girls, and a negative effect on boys,
while bottom students are bad for both sexes.
To the degree that the peer effects literature seeks an answer
to which allocation of students to classes or schools is most ef-
ficient, I feel that it is partially misguided. As I have discussed
in chapter 3, the distributional form of educational achievement
is to a certain degree arbitrary. Changing the assumed achieve-
ment distribution will change the implicit weights given to the
achievement of students in different parts of the distribution,
thus changing efficiency. For example, if peer effects are linear
in normalized test scores, they will look convex in a test score
distribution with right skew, and concave in a distribution with
right skew. If sorting is neutral in the first case, it will look
efficient in the second, and inefficient in the third.
Peer effects are however also relevant for distributional concerns,
as well as for the political economy of private schooling and seg-
regation. In such models, peer effects are thought to be positive,
but their convexity or concavity matters less.
If educational achievement were the only relevant variable, peer
effects combined with a system in which coalitions of students
are allowed to set up their own schools would lead to an equi-
librium in which schools are fully stratified by ability. In such
an equilibrium, no school would accept a student with an abil-
ity under the mean ability of the school, and no student would
accept a school with a lower mean ability than himself. Hans-
mann (1999) argues that such stratification reduces competition
between universities in the US.
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If educational institutions can set tuition fees freely, and stu-
dents care about both achievement and money, peer effects can
facilitate trade between achievement and money. A rich, low
ability student can pay a poor, high ability student. In return,
the high ability student gives up the positive peer effects that
a cognitively homogeneous class at his level would offer, and
shares a class with the rich, low ability student instead. If we
see a student’s ability and his parents’ wealth as belonging to
him, an argument can be made that both efficiency and fairness
require that trade be allowed in the two educational inputs.
Trade between wealth and ability will lead to a hierarchy of
schools, with increasingly high tuition fees and increasingly large
scholarships to attract able students. The top panel of Figure 4.1
shows a partitioning of student space along wealth and ability.
The public school at the bottom left has the lowest tuition fees
and the lowest peer group quality, while private school 4 in the
top right corner has the highest.
Epple and Romano (1998) present a model for exactly such a
market, and discuss the effects of vouchers in a system which
has both exclusive private, and publicly funded schools. Private
schools charge tuition according to ability, while public schools
are free and open to all. Trade in inputs is initially restricted be-
cause of the implicit subsidy to the public schools. As vouchers
are introduced, and students get more freedom to self-organize,
private schools become cheaper. Unsurprisingly perhaps, the
voucher system hurts poor low ability students who see their
better-quality peers leave the public school system. Epple et al.
(2004) find evidence for the relevance of this model in the US
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Figure 4.1: A market for education with one public school and private
schools 1 to 4 (top). A public school sorted according to ability (bot-
tom) can induce high ability students to enter the public system, reducing
the amount of stratification on wealth. Adapted from Epple and Romano
(1998) and Epple et al. (2002).
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market for education.
If we dislike the outcome sketched up above because we feel
that income or wealth based educational stratification is wrong,
it may be possible to counter such stratification by tracking stu-
dents based on ability in the public schools (Epple et al. 2002).
This is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 4.1. The tuition-
free upper public track attracts high ability students that prefer
a private school in the untracked system.
In a similar fashion, Figlio and Page (2000) argue that schools in
disadvantaged neighborhoods can attract high income students
by tracking their students. This may be advantageous even to
the lower track students if there are school level peer effects
across the tracks or if sharing a school with high income high
income students has other advantages.
The dynamics sketched up here suggest that public school track-
ing can be a second-best solution when a small private sector is
desirable, but mandating a public monopoly is politically unfea-
sible.
There may be other ways to achieve a similar outcome. Chak-
rabarti (2005) develops a model of a system where voucher
schools are not allowed to select between applicants. Schools
do nevertheless not become completely destratified by ability be-
cause only committed parents send their children to the voucher
schools. When schools are not allowed to charge fees on top of
the vouchers they receive, the system does however prevent sort-
ing by income.
She then looks at the Milwaukee voucher program, which re-
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quires random selection among applicants and forbids schools
to charge additional fees, and does indeed find sorting by ability
but not by income.
4.2 Dimensions of tracking
Curriculum tracking is the explicit separation of students into
schools or classes based on observed past or expected future
achievement. While it is uncommon to explicitly track at the
primary level, and the norm is to do so at the tertiary, there
are large differences in tracking policies at the secondary level.
Since the Second World War, some countries have postponed
tracking from the end of primary school to the end of middle
school or even to the end of high school, while others have left
their tracking policies unchanged (Benn and Chitty 1996, p. 7;
Marklund 1980, ch. 13). This makes questions on the effects
of tracking highly relevant. At the same time, the variation
in tracking policies, both temporal and spatial, provides us a
means to identify its effects.
Tracking policies vary in many dimensions. Perhaps the most
visible dimension is the age of first tracking. Related measures
are the number of years to be spent in tracked education and
the number of tracks at a certain age. The first two measures
attach an age to a certain threshold amount of tracking, the
third assigns an amount of tracking to a certain reference age.
Tracking may be class-based or school-based. School-based track-
ing is more relevant in an European context, with much varia-
54
tion in school-based tracking policies between countries. In-
ternational comparisons of school-based tracking policies will
therefore tend to ignore strong within-school tracking in the US,
Canada and elsewhere (Betts 2010). In my empirical analysis
below, I will mainly concentrate on the age at which school-
based tracking starts.
Another dimension of tracking is whether stratification is hori-
zontal or vertical. Vertically stratified tracking systems create
a hierarchy of ability or achievement, while horizontal systems
are based on a difference in subject matter. Some tracks may
for example stress the arts more, while others stress scientific
subjects. (cf. Sorensen 1970)
It is also possible to differentiate systems along dimensions like
selectivity, electivity, inclusiveness, scope and track mobility (cf.
Gamoran 1992). Selectivity is a measure of the difference be-
tween tracks, or of the homogeneity within them. Electivity
refers to the extent to which students can choose their track
placement themselves. Inclusiveness indicates the relative sizes
of the tracks: when most students are placed in one track, it
is said to be inclusive. Exclusive tracks create stigma or pres-
tige, depending on which students end up in it.1 Scope refers to
the relative amount of classes that are taken inside the track. A
school may for example track mathematics classes while keeping
common language classes. Track mobility indicates how easy is
it for the students to change tracks once they have entered one.
The multidimensionality of tracking policies brings empirical
1Gamoran defines inclusiveness as the relative size of the upper track.
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problems with it. Combinations of policy changes may have non-
additive effects on outcomes. Perhaps tracking early is not as
bad for intergenerational mobility if the tracks are horizontally
sorted, or if track mobility is high. Because new policies often
entail changes to multiple tracking dimensions, their respective
effects can be hard to disentangle. We will see an example of
this in my analysis of the Swedish comprehensive school reform
in section 5.3.
Nonexperimental comparisons on the other hand suffer from
measurement problems. Internationally comparable information
on tracking policies is scarce, especially outside of the European
Union, and official policies may not reflect de facto segregation
of students. (cf. Brunello and Checci 2007)
I have illustrated the problem in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, where I
have collected similar tracking variables from six different pa-
pers on early tracking. Inclusion in the table is conditional on
inclusion in my own analysis in chapter 5. My assessment based
on tracking status at age 12 or 14 is listed in columns (K1)
and (K2). Columns (H1) and (H2) give the same measure for
thresholds 14 and 15 from Hanushek and Woessmann (2006).
Waldinger (2006) uses an earlier threshold, listed in column (W).
Pfeffer (2009) uses an early tracking indicator with three levels,
listed in column (P). Bedard and Cho (2007) use the number
of years spent in a comprehensive system (B1) and a measure
based on the percentage of higher track students (B2). Brunello
and Checchi (2007) use the age of first selection (C1), the per-
centage of primary and secondary education spent tracked (C2)
and the share of students in upper secondary vocational (C3).
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Ammermueller (A) uses the number of tracks (Ammermueller
2005).
In Figure 4.2 I have illustrated the correlations between these
measures. As can be seen from both the tables and the figure,
authors make substantially different tracking assessments even
when using similar measures.
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Dimension Description
Age of split Children usually attend comprehensive primary
schools, to be split up into tracks at a certain
age. The later this point is, the less stratified
is the system overall.
Duration Number of years students spend in tracked sys-
tems. Related to age of split.
Number of tracks It can be argued that systems with a large num-
ber of tracks are more stratified than those that
have only two.
Vertical or horizontal Vertical tracking refers to a difference in levels,
horizontal tracking to a difference in subjects.
Selectivity Selective systems have larger differences be-
tween tracks, and are more stratified.
Electivity In elective systems, students can choose them-
selves which track to enter. This is more usual
in horizontally sorted tracks (Sorensen 1970)
Inclusiveness The more students attend a certain track, the
more inclusive it is. Exclusive tracks can cre-
ate excessive stigma or prestige. A small but
horizontally sorted track (such as for example
a full-time music school) may not affect overall
stratification very much.
Scope Proportion of time students spend in the
tracked system. A school may for example
track on a single subject only. Tracking sys-
tems with less scope are less stratified.
Track mobility How easy is it to switch tracks past the age of
split? The effects of tracking on intergenera-
tional mobility may be smaller the easier it is
for the student to change his mind later on.
Table 4.2: Dimensions of tracking policies, loosely after Sorensen (1970)
and Gamoran (1992).
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Table 4.3: Different tracking measures. Measures based on the age of
split: Koerselman (K1, K2); Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) (H1, H2);
Waldinger (2006) (W); Pfeffer (Pfeffer2010) (P); Bedard and Cho (2007)
(B1), Brunello and Checchi (2007) (C1, C2).
country K1 K2 H1 H2 W P B1 C1 C2
Argentina 0 0 0 0
Armenia 0 0 0 1
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 11 16 15
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 18 0
Cyprus 0 0 0 1
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 16 25
England 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 16 15
France 0 0 0 1 0 9 15 25
Georgia 0 0
Greece 0 0 0 1 0 9 15 25
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 10 16 27
Indonesia 0 0 0 1
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 9 15 25
Latvia 0 0 0 0 16 25
Macedonia 0 0 0 1
Moldova 0 0 0 0
Morocco 0 0 0 0
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 16 15
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 16 17
Poland 0 0 0 1 15 38
Portugal 0 0 0 1 0 6 15 25
Romania 0 0 0 1
Russia 0 0 0 1 15 22
Scotland 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 16 15
Slovenia 0 0 0 1 1 15 33
South Korea 0 0 1 1 0 9 14 33
Spain 0 0 0 10 16 17
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 16 25
Taiwan 0 0 0 1
Thailand 0 0 0 0
Tunisia 0 0
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 11 55
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continued from previous page
country K1 K2 H1 H2 W P B1 C1 C2
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 18 0
Yemen 0 0
Bulgaria 0 1 1 1 14 36
Iran 0 1 0 0
Italy 0 1 1 1 0 1 8 14 38
Lithuania 0 1 1 1
Philippines 0 1 1 1
Singapore 0 1 1 1
Wallonia 0 1 0 1 7 12 50
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 10 67
Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 11 62
Flanders 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 12 50
Germany 1 1 1 2 4 10 69
Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 11 67
Ireland 1 1 1 1 0 0 11 15 81
Israel 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 1 1 0 13 46
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 0 8 13 50
Slovak Republic 1 1 1 1 1 4 11 62
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Table 4.4: Different tracking measures. Measures based on the percentage
of higher track students: Bedard and Cho (2007) (B2), Brunello and Chec-
chi (2007) (C3). Measures based on the number of tracks: Ammermueller
(2005) (A).
country B2 C3 A
Argentina
Armenia
Australia 100 63
Canada 100 7 1
Cyprus
Denmark 48 53
England 100 72 3
France 48 56 1
Georgia
Greece 61 40 2
Hong Kong 43
Iceland 56 37 1
Indonesia 36
Japan 75 25
Latvia 1
Macedonia
Moldova
Morocco
New Zealand 100 37 2
Norway 31 58 1
Poland 61
Portugal 71 29
Romania
Russia 39 2
Scotland 100 72
Slovenia
South Korea 58 32
Spain 66 38
Sweden 87 50 1
Taiwan
Thailand 24
Tunisia 4
Turkey 39
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
country B2 C3 A
United States 100 0
Yemen
Bulgaria
Iran
Italy 33 27 3
Lithuania
Philippines
Singapore
Wallonia 53 70
Austria 13 72
Czech Republic 19 80 2
Flanders 38 70
Germany 26 63 3
Hungary 28 27 2
Ireland 100 24
Israel 35
Luxembourg 64
Netherlands 38 69
Slovak Republic 24 76
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Figure 4.2: Absolute values of correlations between the tracking measures
reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. A white square indicates a correlation of 0,
a black one a correlation of 1 or -1.
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4.3 The case for and against tracking
Because of the equalizing nature of peer effects, it should be ex-
pected that tracking leads to larger differences in student out-
comes. In tracked systems, students attend more homogeneous
classes, meaning smaller peer effects and thus larger differences.
Apart from the effects of peers, different tracks will usually also
have different curricula. There may also be differences in the
number of hours of teaching as well as in other inputs. The sep-
arate effects of tracking through peers and other inputs is usually
hard to measure. Still, we should in general expect that differ-
ences in inputs between tracks are such that they reinforce the
differences between them. Exceptions may be remedial classes
where some educational inputs are increased to make up for de-
ficiencies in others.
Whether tracking is ‘efficient’ is a priori unclear. One the one
hand, it may be better to teach each student the exact set of
skills that he will need in his future job. This argument is per-
haps the most pervasive when tracking horizontally. The parallel
argument for vertical tracking is to teach to each students at a
pace adapted to his ability.
A comprehensive educational system may however still be pre-
ferred if it better protects against skill depreciation because of
technical change, and this effect outweighs the benefits of spe-
cialization (cf. Brunello et al. 2004). On the other hand, skill
depreciation can just as well be taken as an argument to widen
the upper track (e.g. Maurin and McNally 2007) or to teach a
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more academic curriculum in the lower track, rather than to
delay tracking.
Both specialization and skill depreciation relate to productivity
in a way that is unlikely register on educational tests. Special-
ized skills may not show up in test scores if we try to measure
general skills such as reading and mathematics. Skill depreci-
ation will be much smaller at the time of the test than in the
later part of the individuals’ working careers.
Another argument in favor of tracking is that resources may be
better tailored to the needs of the group in tracked systems.
If we believe in the Lazear model on page 48, for example, we
could put high track students in larger classes than low track
students. In such a world, it may be possible to achieve Pareto
improvements.
Theoretical Pareto improvements may however hide the political
danger that a narrow, exclusive lower track cannot retain the
resources it needs when it no longer draws students from the
upper and middle class voters. The tracked outcome may not in
fact be an improvement for those attending the lower track, not
least because peer effects are relatively large compared to the
effects of a redistribution of financial resources. An example of
this can be found in Brunello and Checchi (2007), where higher
tracks have less students per teacher rather than more.
If the selection mechanism underlying it is good, tracking can
prevent ‘individuals from raising false hopes towards an unattain-
able goal.’ (Ono 2001) On the other hand, if it is not, tracking
may lead to mismatches between students and future jobs. This
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is both because of a generally more noisy measurement of in-
dividual characteristics (Brunello et al. 2004) and because of
the larger impact of parental background when tracking at an
earlier age (Bauer and Riphahn 2006; cf. Ammermueller 2005,
Waldinger 2006, Jerrim and Micklewright 2010). The latter
factor can negatively affect intergenerational mobility (Brunello
and Checchi 2007; Maurin and McNally 2008).
In terms of justice, it can be argued that early tracking systems
are more fair in a meritocratic sense, especially when track se-
lection is determined by a fair achievement test only. On the
other hand, homogeneous comprehensive systems are more just
in an egalitarian sense.
Tracked systems with limited track mobility can be seen as par-
ticularly unjust to individuals who are misclassified as belonging
to the lower track, either because of chance, or because of the
effects of parental background.
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4.4 Empirical evidence on tracking and
efficiency
The European post-war comprehensive school reforms that de-
layed the age of first tracking have led to considerable debate
and research on the effects of tracking. Researchers and policy-
makers have tried to evaluate the reforms at the time of their
implementation, but their efforts have been hindered by a lack
of data, especially on later outcomes, and perhaps also by a lack
of computing power. This has left room for a new round of anal-
yses in the last decade by researchers using linked information
on later outcomes, IV-techniques and modern computers.
Meghir and Palme (2005) and Pekkarinen et al. (2009a, 2009b)
look at the comprehensive school reforms in Sweden and Finland
respectively. They use variation between subsequent cohorts at
the time of a comprehensive school reform. The reform was
not implemented everywhere at the same time, and time trends
can be controlled for. Meghir and Palme find higher average
wages after the reform. Pekkarinen et al. find higher average
test scores after the reform, lower test score variation and higher
intergenerational mobility.
Unfortunately, comprehensive school reforms tend to include
other changes than the postponement of tracking alone, and it is
hard to differentiate between their respective effects. For exam-
ple, it is no surprise that average achievement increases when
the lower track is effectively being integrated into the higher
one, and the quantity of education is increased for the lower
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track students. In the case of Meghir and Palme, an important
part of the reform was an increase in the compulsory school-
ing age, and so the Swedish reform is perhaps better seen as
a combined comprehensive schooling and compulsory schooling
age reform.
An interesting paper in this respect is that of Ofer Malamud and
Christian Pop-Eleches (2007), which looks at a Romanian com-
prehensive school reform in which the curriculum was changed,
but peer group composition was left unaltered. The authors find
that although children from disadvantaged backgrounds were
more likely to complete the academic track after the reform, they
were not more likely to complete university education. Similarly,
the Dutch parliamentary report Parlementair Onderzoek Onder-
wijsvernieuwingen (2008) documents how a reform which aimed
to implement a common curriculum across a tracked school sys-
tem, failed. Differences between schools persisted, and the post-
reform achievement difference between the tracks was just as
large as before.
The UK and South Korea have gone through similar reforms as
Sweden and Finland, but unfortunately educational panel data
are not available across the reforms, and authors have to rely
on cross-sectional snapshots during a time when the reform was
implemented in some regions, but not in others.
In the UK, differences between students increased more in pre-
reform, tracked regions (see e.g. Kerckhoff 1986, Galindo-Rueda
and Vignoles 2004). Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles also find a
positive effect of tracking on average scores. Kim et al. (2003)
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find a positive effect of tracking on average scores in South Ko-
rean data.
International student achievement tests allow for cross-country
comparisons. Eric Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann (2006) use
international test data collected in PISA, PIRLS and TIMSS
since 1995 to estimate the effect of tracking on the distribution
of outcomes. They find lower average achievement and higher
score variation in early tracking countries.
Within the US, within-school tracking is more relevant. Slavin
(1990) reviews a large body of earlier literature, mainly on within-
school tracking in the US. He finds that the effect on average
scores is close to zero.
There is some experimental evidence on tracking as well. Du-
flo et al. (2008) use an educational experiment in Kenya to as-
sess the impact of tracking. They find higher average achieve-
ment combined with a relatively modest increase in inequality.
Even though experimental findings lack many of the identifica-
tion problems that the studies above have to cope with, Duflo
et al. rightly question the generalizability of their results to de-
veloped countries.
In summary, most authors seem to agree that tracking increases
inequality in educational outcomes (cf. Pfeffer 2009). This is
in accordance with our priors. Because of peer effects, track-
ing should cause larger population-wide differences by reducing
within-class heterogeneity, and tracked school systems should
display larger inequality in educational achievement than com-
prehensive school systems.
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At the same time, there is considerable variation in the esti-
mated effect of tracking on mean achievement. I will argue fur-
ther below that these differences can be explained, and are less
inconsistent than they may seem at first glance.
authors effect
comprehensive school reform, panel data
Pekkarinen et al. (2009a) –
comprehensive school reform, cross-section
Kim et al. (2003) +
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004) +
spatial cross-section
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) –
Slavin (1990) 0
experimental
Duflo et al. (2008) +
Table 4.5: Important studies on the effect of tracking on mean test scores.
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Chapter 5
Incentive effects of
curriculum tracking
5.1 Introduction
The literature has mainly focused on the long-term, net effect
of curriculum tracking on educational achievement and wages,
measuring outcomes after the end of compulsory education or
later. I argue that it is also important to look at early-age effects
of tracking policies on student outcomes.
Specifically, tracking creates incentives before its start, amongst
others for students to work harder in order to get into a higher
track. The tracking point is thus a high-stakes moment for the
student, whether the track choice is based on an explicit test or
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not.
We know from the literature that high-stakes tests should have
such effects. Bishop (1998), Jacob (2005) and Neal and Schanzen-
bach (2010) find that high-stakes tests lead to higher student
achievement. This is a subset of a more general literature which
shows that students and teachers respond to incentives (Bishop
2006).
The idea that tracking changes incentives is not new. Waldinger
(2006) mentions the possible existence of incentive effects. In the
model of Eisenkopf (2009), tracking makes educational signaling
more efficient by shifting incentives to an earlier age. Galindo-
Rueda and Vignoles (2004) find incentive effects in UK data,
but the main focus of their paper is on post-tracking outcomes.
In theory, the incentives from tracking may work in many ways.
The most direct incentive effect is through students. It pays for
them to work harder before the tracking point in order to end
up in the higher track. Attending the higher track will give the
student a better peer group, which will in turn increase his future
achievement. Upper track attendance will also usually leave
open the possibility to enter university at the end of secondary
school, and is a labor market signal of ability of its own. All
these factors give the student an incentive to substitute effort
towards the pre-tracking period.
The student may also substitute effort between subjects: from
non-tested subjects to tested ones. This is indeed observable in
Jacob (2005), but not in Winters et al. (2008), who suggest that
positive spillover effects from the tested subjects compensate for
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the crowding-out of non-tested ones.
Teachers have an incentive to teach better as well as to substitute
time and effort towards tested subjects. It seems a reasonable
assumption that teachers should do this for their students’ sake,
but it may also be in their own interest to do so. The track
placement of students (and the possible test preceding it) makes
teacher quality more visible, and makes it easier for principals
to reward and punish teacher effort as well as easier for parents
to choose better schools for their children. Teachers do indeed
change their behavior in expected ways in Jacob (2005).
Even if primary school students may not grasp the full conse-
quences of their track placement, their parents will. To the de-
gree that parents care about their children, they will also have
an increased incentive to aid their children’s learning before the
tracking point, and they are likely to push their children harder
as well.
Across countries, tracking policies may also affect the early cur-
ricula or teaching styles in a more institutionalized way. The
whole educational system may have evolved towards stressing
early achievement more. Of course, the direction of causality
can also run the other way if early achievement oriented coun-
tries have refrained from delaying the tracking point (cf. Betts
2010).
To at least some degree, incentive effects cause students to do
better at tests rather than learn more on an underlying level
(cf. Klein et al. 2000, Jacob 2005). This is a problem if we
want to use incentives to increase underlying achievement. For
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the methodological implications of incentive effects however, the
measured scores are more relevant than underlying achievement.
Incentive effects can lead to inflated test scores relative to long-
term effects of underlying achievement, whether the disparity
is caused by temporary bumps in underlying or in measured
achievement.
My contribution to the literature is to make a comprehensive em-
pirical investigation into the incentive effects of tracking. The
possible endogeneity of early age behavior by forward looking
agents is ignored too often in the economics of education liter-
ature, and while the idea of incentive effects is sometimes men-
tioned as an incidental effect of a particular reform, but remains
largely unrecognized as a general prinicple. I argue that our
prior should be that early age test scores are endogenous with
regard to later age policies. By collecting evidence from multi-
ple data sets, I wish to demonstrate that incentive effects are a
general effect of tracking.
I use three sources of variation in tracking policies: the large
post-war UK and Swedish comprehensive school reforms as well
as contemporary cross-country variation in tracking policies.
While the UK data allow us to control for unobservables with
individual ability, one can condition on municipality and time
fixed effects in the Swedish data. Based on this information
only, one could conclude that the Swedish estimate will be the
most informative, and the cross-country estimate the least.
I will however argue that while the Swedish estimates may or
may not accurately reflect the effect of the Swedish comprehen-
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sive school reform, the reform involved so many more changes
to other policies than tracking, that the UK analysis is the most
informative on incentive effects.
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5.2 UK evidence for incentive effects
Since the Second World War, the UK has gradually gone from
a tracked to a comprehensive school system. In the old sys-
tem, students were split around age 11, after which they either
entered an upper track grammar school, or a lower-track sec-
ondary modern, at least partly based on an achievement test.
In the new system, all students attended a comprehensive school
in order to make available to all children “all that is valuable in
grammar school education” (Government Circular 10/65, 1965).
The Labour government had entered the 1964 elections with a
promise to abolish the tracked educational system, and wanted
to impose the new comprehensive system “as rapid as possible.”
Even so, the Labour government “requested” rather than de-
manded that Local Education Authorities (LEAs) change their
policies, and the rate of change was initially limited.
The hesitant Labour attitude was induced by both practical and
political concerns. On the one hand, extensive planning was
needed in order to create the new schools, in part because of ex-
isting investment in school buildings. On the other hand, LEAs
had had considerable autonomy in setting educational policies
themselves since 1944, and their position was strengthened by
the rather narrow Labour majority in parliament in combination
with opposition against reform from within the Labour party.
In the end, comprehensive schools were implemented in a region-
by-region, school-by-school fashion, both by merging or convert-
ing existing schools and by creating new ones. (Government
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Circular 10/65, 1965; Benn and Chitty 1996, ch. 1; Kerckhoff et
al. 1996, ch. 2)
The survey most appropriate to study the UK reform is the
longitudinal National Child Development Study (University of
London 2008). It aims to follow all those born in Great Britain
in the week starting on the 3rd of March 1958. The 1958 cohort
turned 11 in 1969, when one part of them were selected into one
of two tracks, while the other part entered the comprehensive
school system. I will use the 1958 sweep (at the time called
Perinatal Mortality Survey) as well as the 1965, 1969 and 1974
sweeps, when the subjects were 0, 7, 11 and 16 years old.
As can be seen from Table 5.1, out of the full sample of 18558
students 11098 are left after we require age 7 and age 11 test
scores as well as geographical information to be known. I treat
the other 7460 as missing at random conditional on observables.
Another 2984 disappear from the sample when we require track-
ing information to be known. This is mostly due to students at-
tending private schools. A small number of private schools indi-
cate that they are comprehensive in the survey. When I include
these as comprehensive, and other private schools as tracked,
the empirical results stay virtually unchanged. I therefore only
report results excluding private school students.
I also disregard students whose schools turned comprehensive in
the very year they took the age 11 test, I have 7150 students
left in the final sample.
The 1974 sweep of the NCDS recorded the tracking status and
reform year of the school the individuals were attending at that
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students difference
full sample 18558 0
age 7 and 11 scores known 12066 -6492
age 11 LEA known 11098 -968
tracking status known 8114 -2984
tracking change not in 1969 7150 -964
Table 5.1: Number of students in the full NCDS sample, as well as in sub-
samples with increasingly stringent inclusion conditions. The main reason
for missing tracking information is private school attendance.
point. This measure can be used to reconstruct the year of
reform relative to 1969, the year the individuals entered the
secondary school system.
The distribution of students exposed to the different reform
years in the sample can be seen from Figure 5.1. The students
on the left side of the figure entered a secondary school that
had reformed before 1969, which means that the students en-
tering them could be sure of its comprehensive status. Those
on the right side entered a school that reformed only after 1969,
i.e. after our cohort had entered them. Students may have had
some information on the coming reform, but their subjective
probability of entering a tracked system will have been smaller
the later the reform actually took place. Students in the ‘later’
category were never part of a comprehensive school during their
educational career.
There are multiple measures of age 11 achievement in the data: a
general ability test containing both verbal and non-verbal items,
a reading comprehension test and a mathematics/arithmetic
test. In addition to these, we have teacher assessments of stu-
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Figure 5.1: Number of students in sample by reform year. The students in
the sample all turned 11 in 1969, at which point they were split into tracks in
the pre-reform system. Those entering reformed secondary schools (reform
year before 1969) should be expected to have lower age 11 scores than those
entering schools that reformed after 1969.
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dent abilities in different domains.
I synthesize all these variables into one in a two step process.
First, I convert all test score distributions to a z-scores because
their shapes are arbitrary and skewed, and contain little cardi-
nal level information on underlying achievement. Then, I extract
the first principal component of the normalized scores to end up
with a measure of general achievement. This process also has the
advantage of reducing measurement error from any of the spe-
cific tests. Even if the original separate tests yield discrete score
distributions, the weighted average of their transformations is
smooth enough to be treated as continuous.
I calculate reliability ratios for both the age 7 and age 11 prin-
cipal components under the assumption that all measurement
error is white noise. This allows me to inflate the measures’
standard deviations in such a way that the point estimates will
be expressed in standard deviations of the signal. Because the
reliability ratios are close to unity, the difference between this
method and simply reporting effect sizes is small in practice.
I encode the tracking status at age 11 (Ts) as a dummy indi-
cating whether the student’s school turned comprehensive before
1969, or after. I also select two groups of control variables, listed
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 starting on page 90. The first group Ai
consists of standardized age 7 scores and teacher ratings. These
include the results of a word recognition and word comprehen-
sion test, a copying designs test to assess perceptuo-motor abil-
ities, a draw-a-man test to assess general mental and perceptual
abilities, and an arithmetic test.
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The second group Xi is a selection of a wide variety of parent
and student background variables. I choose not to linearize any
of these variables and treat them all as categorical in order to
capture as much variation as possible.
Unfortunately for our purposes, reforms were not implemented
at random. Richer, right-wing areas were slower to reform (Benn
and Chitty 1996, ch. 1, Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles 2004),
and a simple comparison of tracked and comprehensive areas
or schools is therefore likely to show incentive effects even if
none exist in reality. Successful identification of the causal ef-
fect of tracking will have to come from adequately controlling for
primary school inputs such as ability and parental background.
Selection problems can however be expected to be smaller than
for later-age educational analyses because the primary school
system is relatively homogeneous.
Additionally, there may be selection within and between regions
due to noncompliance. Families with good students can move
to a tracked area when faced with a comprehensive secondary
school, while families with poor students may seek out compre-
hensive areas.
In areas where upper track schools remained, the new compre-
hensive school may in effect become the new lower track school,
with the upper track school attracting all good pupils. Since
we can control for ability and background, both forms of selec-
tion will lead to an overestimate of incentive effects only to the
degree that movers are unobservably different in the expected
direction.
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To take into account the hierarchical nature of the data, I es-
timate a multilevel or hierarchical linear model (e.g. Gelman
and Hill 2007, Pinheiro and Bates 2009) with regressors and
error terms on different, nested levels. For the baseline re-
gressions there are two levels: individuals, and LEA×reform
year combinations, which I will henceforth call ‘schools’. To
use LEA×reform year yields slightly larger units, which should
lead to more conservative standard errors than using individual
schools.
In the first specification
ys,i = α+ Tsβ + εs + εi (5.1)
individual achievement ys,i is regressed on a school level tracking
variable Ts, and includes error terms both on the school and on
the individual level.
Adding individual-level control matrices Ai and Xi allows us to
explore the estimated effects of these background factors on an
individual level, while retaining a school level estimate of the
incentive effect of tracking.
ys,i = α+ Tsβ +Aiγ + εs + εi (5.2)
ys,i = α+ Tsβ +Aiγ +Xiδ + εs + εi (5.3)
The estimates for these specifications can be seen from the Table
5.2.
The first column shows the unadjusted relationship between age
11 scores and the tracking variable is 0.15 of a UK standard devi-
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Dependent variable: UK achievement age 11 (1969)
specification (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6)
tracking (T ) 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.08
0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
ability (Ai) yes yes yes yes yes
controls (Xi) yes yes yes yes
students 7150 7150 7150 5634 7150 7150
grouping schools schools schools schools LEAs years
groups 645 645 645 556 167 10
Table 5.2: Incentive effects in the UK. Students who knew their lower
secondary school would be comprehensive score lower than those who had
reason to expect a tracked school. Standard errors in italics.
ation. This is a sizable difference, but probably an overestimate
of the causal effect.
Turning to column (5.2), we can see that the estimated effect
indeed declines to 0.10 when we control for age 7 scores. If
we are lucky, the inclusion of age 7 test scores is enough to
control for the nonrandom nature of the tracking reforms. In
column (5.3), I have added all background variables in Xi as
well. The estimate now stands at an only slightly smaller 0.09.
This strongly suggests that age 7 test scores pick up most of the
selection, and that even less selection is left after the inclusion
of Xi.
Even if we can control for the non-randomness of reform areas,
we are still left with possible problems of student selection be-
tween and within areas. I rerun specification (5.3) to include
only students that did not move to a different LEA between
ages 7 and 11. This reduces the number of students from 7150 to
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5634, and the number of schools from 645 to 556 (the sampling
method causes individual schools to be represented by small
numbers of students). As can be seen from column (5.4), the
estimate even increases a bit to 0.10.
Next, I look at possible selection within areas by using the share
of students exposed to a tracked school within each area as the
measure of tracking for each student. I define an area as the Lo-
cal Education Authority: the policy-setting authority of which
there are 167 in the sample. As can be seen from column (5.5)
however, the point estimate is larger than in the baseline model
suggesting that within-LEA selection is not a problem given the
controls available to us.
As an additional check, I group all schools together by reform
year, and define tracking as a year-level indicator variable.
yy,i = α+ Tyβ +Aiγ +Xiδ + εy + εi (5.6)
Even with a low number of year observations, the tracking esti-
mate is still significantly different from zero, at a slightly lower
point estimate of 0.08 because the results are now weighted by
year rather than by school.
An illustration of this specification can be seen from Figure 5.2.
The students on the left side of the figure knew they were go-
ing to enter a comprehensive school while those on the right
side did not. We can speculate that those attending schools
that reformed later had both less uncertainty over the contin-
ued tracked status of their secondary school and a larger actual
incentive to enter the higher track. Such a pattern is indeed vis-
84
dependent variable age 11 age 7
specification (5.7) (5.8)
tracking (T ) 0.13 0.04
0.03 0.04
controls (Xi) yes yes
students 7150 7150
grouping schools schools
groups 645 645
Table 5.3: Placebo test for UK incentive effects using early age scores.
ible in the figure. Early test scores are not only larger for those
entering a tracked school, but are also increasing in the number
of years the reform lies in the future for any particular student.
I also estimate a model with age 7 achievement as the depen-
dent variable as a kind of placebo test under the assumption that
incentive effects should be weaker the longer before the track-
ing point we measure achievement. Since we cannot control for
early age scores when using them as the dependent variable, we
should expect these estimates to include some selection. Still,
as can be seen from Table 5.3, the estimated treatment effect
is much smaller and not significantly different from zero for age
7 outcomes. Because I have inflated test scores to account for
measurement error, this result is unlikely to be due to the age
7 measurements being more noisy. I interpret the results of
the test as additional evidence for the credibility of the original
specification.
Do incentive effects differ by gender or background? I add an in-
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Figure 5.2: Secondary schools left of the divide turned comprehensive be-
fore the NCDS students could enter them. Achievement estimates from
specification (5.6). Circles indicate the year-level errors.
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teraction with gender to specification (5.3). Estimated incentive
effects are larger for boys, but not significantly so. I also add in-
teractions on father’s socioeconomic status to specification (5.3),
but no monotonic pattern can be seen, and the uncertainty of
the interactions is large. I have illustrated these results in Figure
5.3.
A quantile regression version of specification (5.3) suggests that
incentive effects are slightly larger at the higher end of the dis-
tribution. This difference is however not statistically significant.
To illustrate this, I have used quantile regression on 100 boot-
strap replications of the data, subtracted the estimated effect on
the median in every replication, and plotted the 5th, 50th and
95th percentile estimate for every test score quantile in Figure
5.4. This produces an indication of confidence bounds on the
slope rather than on the location of the quantile profile.
Summarizing, incentive effects look credible in the UK setting.
The biggest threats to identification are the non-random na-
ture of changes in tracking policies as well as noncompliance
by parents and students. The estimated effect of tracking on
achievement growth between ages 7 and 11 is however virtually
unchanged when we add background variables as controls, lend-
ing credibility to the identification strategy. Neither excluding
movers nor using LEA-level tracking variables change the point
estimate much. Conclusions are even robust to grouping obser-
vations per reform year rather than by school, and survive an
early-age placebo test.
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Figure 5.3: Estimated incentive effects for different subgroups. Bars indi-
cate the 95% confidence interval. The size of the effect is not significantly
different between boys and girls. No monotonic pattern can be found in
the socio-economic background of the student.
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overall tracked compr.
variable name mean sd mean mean
dependent variable y
Achievement age 11 0.00 1.00 0.04 -0.18
early ability Ai
Arithmetic score age 7 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.06
Copying designs score age 7 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.05
Drawing score age 7 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.02
Reading score age 7 0.00 1.00 0.03 -0.13
Creativity rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.06
Numbers rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.03 -0.11
Oral ability rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.05
Reading rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.03 -0.12
World awareness rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.02 -0.09
Table 5.4: NCDS student-weighted descriptive statistics of the un-
derlying values of y and Ai.
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Table 5.5: NCDS student-weighted descriptive statistics of the underlying
values of Xi.
overall tracked compr.
variable name mean mean mean
Additional controls Xi
Female 0.49 0.49 0.50
Height age 11
1st quintile group 0.19 0.18 0.21
1st quintile group 0.19 0.19 0.17
2nd quintile group 0.19 0.19 0.18
3rd quintile group 0.19 0.19 0.18
4th quintile group 0.19 0.19 0.18
5th quintile group 0.07 0.07 0.08
Father figure
natural father 0.91 0.91 0.90
other 0.06 0.06 0.07
no information 0.03 0.03 0.04
Father reads to child
often 0.33 0.34 0.31
occasionally 0.33 0.33 0.34
hardly ever 0.26 0.26 0.27
no information 0.07 0.07 0.08
Mother reads to child
often 0.46 0.47 0.43
occasionally 0.34 0.33 0.36
hardly ever 0.16 0.15 0.16
no information 0.04 0.04 0.05
Socio-economic status father
professional 0.04 0.04 0.03
manegerial/technical 0.16 0.17 0.14
skilled nonmanual 0.09 0.09 0.09
skilled manual 0.42 0.42 0.44
semi-skilled 0.16 0.16 0.17
unskilled 0.05 0.05 0.06
no information 0.06 0.06 0.06
Father’s education ISCED
5 0.03 0.03 0.02
3 0.16 0.17 0.15
2 0.54 0.55 0.52
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
overall tracked compr.
variable name mean mean mean
1 0.01 0.01 0.02
no information 0.25 0.25 0.29
Mother’s education ISCED
5 0.02 0.02 0.01
3 0.19 0.19 0.19
2 0.57 0.57 0.56
1 0.01 0.01 0.01
no information 0.21 0.20 0.23
Father reads books
often 0.46 0.47 0.42
occasionally 0.20 0.19 0.23
hardly ever 0.27 0.27 0.26
no information 0.07 0.07 0.08
Mother reads books
often 0.32 0.32 0.29
occasionally 0.21 0.21 0.22
hardly ever 0.42 0.41 0.44
no information 0.05 0.05 0.05
Accomodation type
house 0.86 0.86 0.84
flat 0.07 0.07 0.08
rooms 0.02 0.01 0.02
no information or other 0.05 0.00 0.00
Father born
British Isles 0.90 0.90 0.88
Eire or Ulster 0.03 0.03 0.03
other 0.04 0.04 0.05
Mother born
British Isles 0.91 0.92 0.89
Eire or Ulster 0.03 0.03 0.03
other 0.04 0.03 0.06
Poor at English age 7
no 0.97 0.98 0.95
somewhat 0.01 0.01 0.02
certainly 0.00 0.00 0.01
no information 0.01 0.01 0.02
Child goes reluctantly to school, age 7
no 0.86 0.86 0.86
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
overall tracked compr.
variable name mean mean mean
yes 0.10 0.10 0.10
no information 0.04 0.04 0.04
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5.3 Incentives in the Swedish compre-
hensive school reform
In the Sweden of the 1940s, there was a widespread feeling that
that the educational system was inadequate for the country’s
needs. It was increasingly difficult to enter one of the limited
number of upper track lower secondary schools, and this problem
was only to increase when the big cohorts born immediately after
the war were to enter secondary education.
The lower track was felt to be lacking as well. Other countries
had been increasing the length of compulsory education, and
Sweden was seen as falling behind. At the same time, the edu-
cational system was becoming a tool for the emancipation both
of women and of the rural areas. It was also to foster demo-
cratic values, not by indoctrination but by “promoting respect
for truth and the motivation to find it.” (Statens Offentliga
Utredningar 1948, p. 3)
While there was general agreement that the educational system
needed to be improved, the question of whether tracking should
be postponed at the same time led to a long debate. In 1950,
parliament reached an agreement first to implement a compre-
hensive school in a select number of municipalities only. These
schools were experimental, and had varying degrees of within-
school tracking (Marklund 1981).
In 1962 parliament accepted the general implementation of the
nine-year comprehensive secondary school, with within-school
differentiation only in the 9th grade, even if within-subject dif-
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ferentiation continued to exist at earlier ages. (Marklund 1980,
1982, Richardson 1977/2004)
Sweden moved from a patchwork of schools and systems, many
of them underresourced, to a single compulsory, comprehensive
school. This changed both the curriculum, the quality of educa-
tion and its quantity. In the new system, families also received
additional financial support now that they had to keep their
children longer in school. (Marklund 1981)
It is important to stress that the reform also involved changes
in the first six grades of primary school. The amount of English
teaching was increased in part at the cost of Swedish. Though
perhaps concentrated mainly in the years immediately follow-
ing the 1950 decision, there was also experimentation with new
teaching methods, involving less frontal instruction. (Marklund
1981)
It is not self-evident a priori how early incentives were affected
by the Swedish comprehensive school reform. On the one hand,
students competing for the upper track in the old system lost
an early incentive when early selection was replaced with a later
and softer selection mechanism, which was more elective, less
exclusive and had less scope. On the other hand, the later edu-
cational opportunities may have increased for many, increasing
the option value of continued effort.
To see whether any patterns can be found, I use the first two co-
horts of the longitudinal Evaluation Through Follow-up studies
(Swedish abbreviation: UGU) collected by the Department of
Pedagogics at the University of Gothenburg and Statistics Swe-
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den (see Harnqvist 2000). The surveys aimed to interview all
born in Sweden on the 5th, 15th and 25th of each month in 1948
and 1953. The proportion of students for which background in-
formation is available is very high. For the 1948 cohort, the
proportion of the target population for which background infor-
mation is known is 98%. For the 1953 cohort this number is
somewhat lower at 93% due to limited resources at Statistics
Sweden.
The majority of the 1948 cohort was in 6th grade in the aca-
demic year starting in 1960, at a time when experimentation
with comprehensive schools was fully underway. When the 1953
cohort entered 6th grade in 1965, the comprehensive school had
been implemented in most, but not all municipalities.
I have data on spatial, verbal and inductive components of an
age 12 ability test for most students, as well as standardized
tests in mathematics for those who were in 6th grade of primary
school. I transform each subscale into a standard normal dis-
tribution, take their first principal component and inflate it so
that the standard deviation of the latent trait is one.
I have at least some information for 21877 students in 1020 mu-
nicipalities in the full sample. As can be seen from Table 5.6,
this decreases to 19946 students in 1013 municipalities for which
I have information on IQ, and further to 17427 students in 1005
municipalities for those which I have math scores as well.
While it may not be all too far from the truth that the students
without IQ scores were missing at random, the students with IQ
scores but without a mathematics test score are not a random
96
students municipalities
full sample 21877 1020
with IQ scores 19946 1013
with IQ and math scores 17427 1005
..of which tracked in 1948 8277 801
..of which comprehensive in 1948 1013 145
..of which tracked in 1953 1643 313
..of which comprehensive in 1953 6494 617
Table 5.6: Number of observations in the full UGU 1948 and 1953 sam-
ple, as well as in the subsample with known ability scores and ability and
mathematics scores respectively. As can be seen from the last four rows,
the panel of municipalities is not balanced.
selection. They partly consist of those that either were not in
the 6th grade when their peers were, and of those that had
transferred to an upper track school at an earlier age. I will
look at the effects of excluding this group further below.
I define a municipality as tracking if at least one student in the
municipality is in a tracked school. According to this definition,
85% of municpalities in the final sample were tracked in 1960
and 34% were in 1965.
I consider two families of models. In the fixed effects models
yi = α+ Tiβ +MCiγ +Xiδ + Ziζ + εi (5.10)
yi is an ability or achievement outcome, Ti is municipal tracking
status, MCi is a matrix of municipality and cohort indicators,
Xi is a matrix with municipality×cohort background variables,
Zi is a matrix with individual background variables, and εi is
the error term. I weight individual observations with the inverse
of the number of observations per municipality×cohort, and use
97
Dependent variable:
IQ math math IQ
early tracking -0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.02
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03
ability controls yes
other controls yes yes yes yes
students 17427 17427 17427 19946
groups 1864 1864 1864 1919
Table 5.7: Estimates of the effects of the Swedish comprehensive school
reform on early test scores.
standard errors clustered on the municipality×cohort level.
An alternative family of models uses county and cohort fixed
effects, with separate intercepts for the three largest cities, and
municipality×cohort random effects.
ymc,i = α+ Tmcβ + CCmcγ +Xmcδ + Ziζ + εmc + εi (5.11)
The random effects model can be more efficient, but it cannot
control for potential municipality level selection.
To test for bias in the random effects models, I do a Hausman
specification test under the assumption that the fixed effects
model is consistent. For most specifications I reject the null
that the random effects model is consistent at the 5% level. I
therefore only report results from the fixed effects models below.
I have listed estimation results in Table 5.7. As can be seen
from the first column, there seems to be a significantly negative
conditional relationship between tracking and IQ, while we can
see from the second column that the coefficient on math scores
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is not significantly different from zero.
The apparent effect on IQ components seems implausibly large,
especially considering that many elements of the reform regard
older ages than the one tested. For example, Pekkarinen et al.
(2009a) find effects on later age military test scores an order of
magnitude smaller than these. Even if we believe that incentive
effects are stronger than the later age effects of tracking, how
can it be possible that policy has a larger effect on ability than
on mathematics?
One explanation could be that measurement error is much larger
for mathematics than for IQ. Unfortunately, there is not enough
information in the UGU data set to check for this.
Another possibility is that the sample is not representative of the
student population in each municipality. Mathematics scores are
only known for those students who were in the 6th grade of ei-
ther the new comprehensive school or of the old primary school.
Missing mathematics scores have two effects on the estimates.
I rerun the IQ regression of the second column on a sample
including the students with missing mathematics scores. As can
be seen from the fourth column of Table 5.7, selectively missing
students within municipalities seem to be able to explain most
of the negative conditional correlation between tracking and IQ.
Selective nonresponse is an argument in favor of controlling for
ability as it identifies a mechanism by which ability scores can be
conditionally correlated with tracking even if there is no causal
effect of the reform on ability.
Under the assumption that the true effect of tracking on IQ is
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zero, we can use it to control for selection. As can be seen from
the third column in the table, the estimated effect of the reform
on math scores conditional on ability scores is very close to zero.
The best estimate of the reform effect on IQ comes from the
fourth column in Table 5.7, and the best estimate of the effect
on mathematics skills comes either from the second or the third,
depending on assumptions. None of these three estimates is sig-
nificantly different from zero. It is possible to obtain borderline
significantly positive or negative effects with other model varia-
tions, but these results are never robust to small and arbitrary
model changes.
It is possible that the lack of clear results are due to measure-
ment error in the reform variable. To check on this, I merge the
UGU data with reform years by municipality which Holmlund
(2007) has collected. I obtain point estimates close to the es-
timates in Table 5.7, and I conclude that measurement error is
not likely to be the main driver of these results.
The Swedish comprehensive school reform changed many as-
pects of education simultaneously, and what we measure are the
combined effects of multiple mechanisms. The reform involved
many changes, including the pre-test curriculum and perhaps
also in pre-test teaching styles, in the option value of continued
education and in its cost as well as in the amount of compul-
sory education. It is possible that what we are measuring is
a positive incentive effect of tracking canceled out by a com-
bination of changing general incentives and improved early age
learning. In this respect, the British reform is a much cleaner
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policy experiment than the Swedish one.
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5.4 International evidence for incen-
tive effects
The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational
Achievement administers various standardized tests in a large
number of countries. This allows us to look for incentive ef-
fects cross-sectionally. I use two waves of two of the most well-
known studies: the Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study TIMSS, and the Progress in International Read-
ing Literacy Study (IEA 1995, 2001, 2003, 2006). PIRLS is
an internationally comparable early age reading literacy survey.
TIMSS surveys mathematics and science literacy at three differ-
ent grades, of which I use the earliest. Both surveys aim to test
a representative sample of the population of fourth graders in
the participating countries. I take the average of TIMSS math-
ematics and science scores to get a more general measure of
achievement.
I make no attempts to estimate measurement error in these data,
and I standardize the achievement measures to have standard
deviation one in the student population in my sample. Rinder-
mann (2007) however finds high correlations between country
means in international achievement surveys. This is an indi-
cation that measurement problems in international surveys are
perhaps not as large as one could otherwise think, at least when
it comes to country means.
I take tracking information mainly from the Eurybase database
(Eurydice 2008), supplemented with information from Wikipedia
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and from various countries’ ministry of education websites. I
drop a small number of nonwestern countries with conflicting
information on tracking policies. The tracking variable I will
use is the age at which a substantial proportion of students will
be tracked into different schools. This definition is close to that
of Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), and aids a comparison with
their results. Even though I try to pinpoint the start of tracking
in each country to an exact age, I use a dummy variable in the
analysis, indicating tracking at an age of 12 or earlier. Though
this seems somewhat arbitrary, it is not more so than to assume
that incentive effects would be linear in years. Nevertheless, re-
sults are robust to using a different cutoff, or using a continuous
tracking age instead.
As control variables, I use real per capita purchasing power-
adjusted GDP (expressed in 10 000 USD) from the Penn World
Table (2006) as well as educational expenditures as a percentage
of GDP from the World Bank EdStat database (2011). For
GDP, the year of observation is always 1995. For educational
expenditures, it is the available observation the closest to 1995.
Descriptive statistics for these and other variables can be seen
from Table 5.8. I have complete data on 1040596 students in 51
countries.
A more useful sample is probably the subset of countries in the
original sample that is a member of the European Economic
Area or EEA. Not only is the EEA a more homogeneous group
of countries, reducing omitted variable bias, the tracking mea-
sure used is most relevant in a European context, as it classifies
within-school tracking countries as late tracking (Betts 2010).
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weighting
by student by country
variable µ σ µ σ
Full sample:
test score 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.89
per capita GDP (’0 000 1995 USD) 1.46 0.99 1.41 0.82
educational expenditures (%GDP) 4.52 1.32 4.99 1.58
books at home 0.31 0.32
female 0.47 0.48
students 1040596
countries 51
European Economic Area only:
test score 0.41 0.68 0.30 0.68
per capita GDP (’0 000 1995 USD) 1.75 0.53 1.54 0.68
educational expenditures (%GDP) 4.96 0.91 5.23 1.33
books at home 0.34 0.35
female 0.50 0.49
students 515788
countries 28
Table 5.8: International data: descriptive statistics for the full sample (top),
and for the EEA countries only (bottom).
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This reduces the sample to 515788 students in 28 countries.
As in Section 5.2, I estimate a multilevel model to take into ac-
count the errors individuals have in common when they share a
class, school or country. The error structure in all specifications
is nested, and given by
ε ≡ εcn + εs + εcl + εi
where subscripts cn, s, cl and i stand for country, school, class
and individual respectively.
The first specification gives the raw relationship between in-
dividual scores ycn,s,cl,i, and the country-level tracking regime
Tcn. The multilevel model takes care of the difference in levels
in its calculation of standard errors of the various parameter es-
timates. I add an variable Ds indicating whether the score is a
PIRLS or a TIMSS score.
ycn,s,cl,i = α+ Tcnβ +Dsγ + ε (5.12)
The results from estimating this equation can be seen from col-
umn (5.12) in Table 5.9. Countries with early tracking clearly
have higher score means, with the mean difference as large as
0.41 standard deviations of international student test scores.
There is no reason to assume that the estimated effect is not due
to some third factor. This becomes apparent when we add real
per capita GDP and educational expenditure as controls in the
next specification. Both variables are contained in the country
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Dependent variable: international early age achievement
(5.12) (5.13) (5.14) (5.15) (5.16)
tracking (T ) 0.41 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.26
0.19 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.07
GDP 0.38 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05
expenditures -0.08 0.03 0.02 0.03
0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03
books at home 0.14
0.00
T×books at home 0.00
0.04
female 0.04
0.00
T×female -0.05
0.02
students 1040596 1040596 515788 515788 515788
countries 51 51 28 28 28
Table 5.9: International evidence for incentive effects; pooled multilevel
regression based on international data. Standard errors in italics.
level matrix Ccn.
ycn,s,cl,i = α+ Tcnβ +Dsγ + Ccnδ + ε (5.13)
The estimates from this specification can be seen from column
(5.13). Estimated incentive effects are now more than halved at
0.17 standard deviations.
However when we turn to the EEA sample, the estimate is im-
proved in many ways. It can be seen from column (5.14). GDP
and educational expenditures now play a much smaller role, both
turning statistically insignificant.
At 0.23, the estimated incentive effects are now larger, but also
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much more precisely estimated. This is exactly what we should
expect if the tracking variable has classical measurement error
for non-EEA countries. Another indication that this is the bet-
ter estimate is that the estimated effect of educational expendi-
tures now has the expected sign, even if it is insignificant.
I have illustrated the estimate from specification (5.14) in Fig-
ure 5.5. As can be seen from the figure, a specification linear
in age may seem to fit the data better, but the results would
become more sensitive to the exact tracking ages we assign to
late tracking countries.
The estimate is still not likely to reflect a causal effect in the
sense that a country that randomly decides to change its track-
ing policies is likely not to experience a change in early test
scores as large as 0.23 international standard deviations. One
can easily imagine that the pattern is a combination of incentive
effects of tracking, and a tendency for countries that stress the
importance of achievement on hard, testable subjects in primary
school to have retained a tracked secondary school system. The
remarkably strong pattern in Figure 5.5 does however suggest
that early tracking and early achievement are strongly related.
I estimate whether estimated effects differ for children with dif-
ferent parental backgrounds. For this, I use a dummy variable
Bi which indicates whether the student has one case of books
or more at home, the only SES variable that is available for all
four surveys.
ycn,s,cl,i = α+Tcnβ+Dsγ+Ccnδ+Biθ+(Bi ·Tcn)κ+ε (5.15)
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Figure 5.5: An illustration of the EEA estimate of incentive effects from
specification (5.14). Early tracking countries have higher conditional early
test scores. The solid line represents the estimate, dots indicate the country-
level errors. The horizontal axis has been jittered slightly to improve visi-
bility.
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Because this specification includes an interaction between vari-
ables on two different levels, I bootstrap the standard error for
the interaction term.
Results can be seen from column (5.15). Students with more
than one case of books at home score higher on average, but the
interaction with tracking is insignificant and close to zero.
In the last specification, I check whether the effects are differ-
ent for boys than for girls. Fi is a dummy variable indicating
whether the individual is female.
ycn,s,cl,i = α+Tcnβ+Dsγ+Ccnδ+Fiλ+(Fi ·Tcn)µ+ε (5.16)
Looking at column (5.16) of Table 5.9, we can see that the dif-
ferences between boys and girls are moderately small at -0.05.
Both the unclear differences in parental background and the
smaller point estimate of incentive effects for girls mirror the
UK findings.
Hanushek and Woessmann make a slightly different assessment
of the tracking age, even if they define tracking in the same
way. A re-run of my regressions with an age 14 tracking dummy
based on the Hanushek and Woessmann variable gives higher
and more precise point estimates in specifications (5.12) and
(5.13), but makes no difference in the EEA sample of the later
specifications.
All in all, international test score data provide us with an addi-
tional line of evidence for incentive effects. The estimated effect
is unlikely to reflect an unidirectional causal link between track-
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ing and early test scores only, but the relationship is nevertheless
exceptionally clear.
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5.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I have looked for incentive effects of curriculum
tracking in the UK, across countries and in Sweden. Given eco-
nomic intuition as well as previous empirical research on high-
stakes testing, it should be expected that tracking has an in-
centive effect on test scores before its start; parents, teachers
and students should all be expected to respond to the incentives
created.
I find empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. In UK data,
tracking seems to cause an incentive effect of 0.09 UK standard
deviations. Within the European Economic Area, tracking is
associated with 0.23 international standard deviations higher
scores. In the British case the estimates are likely to reflect a
causal mechanism from the comprehensive school reform on test
scores, while the international estimates capture both the effects
of tracking on achievement and the effects of culture on both.
These estimates are large, but not larger than the 0.2–0.3 Jacob
(2005) finds for a high-stakes test.
The Swedish results are much more unclear. We are probably
seeing the effects of both multiple causal mechanisms and mul-
tiply types of selection at the same time. It is hard to draw
any conclusions on incentive effects. Both positive and negative
incentive effects are consistent with the data under different as-
sumptions.
Incentive effects have methodological implications. The exis-
tence of incentive effects makes value-added estimates of the
later age effects of tracking (e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann
111
2006, cf. Todd and Wolpin 2003) misspecified. Pre-tracking test
scores are not exogenous, but positively related to early track-
ing, leading to a downward bias in tracking estimates that use
early test scores to control for unobservables.
I have illustrated this in Figure 5.6. If we compare an early
tracking to a late tracking country, the late tracking system may
appear to be more successful because it seems to catch up to the
early tracking country during the years in which tracking policies
differ. This is however not the relevant comparison because the
reason why the late tracking country had lower early test scores
in the first place is exactly because it tracks late.
If we accept the invalidity of value-added specifications, we can
reconcile previous studies on the long-term effect of tracking. I
have listed some current papers on the mean effect of tracking
in Table 5.10. The effect on the mean is negative in Pekkarinen
et al. as well as in Hanushek and Woessmann.
We should not be surprised to find an apparent negative effect
of tracking in studies of postwar reforms such as Pekkarinen et
al. The reforms simultaneously changed the tracking structure
and improved the quantity and quality of education of those
previously in the lower track, and we are measuring the effects
of both. A policy experiment more relevant to tracking poli-
cies today would be if a country with a modern vocational track
such as Germany were to postpone its tracking point. The pos-
itive effects of such a reform on mean test scores could be much
smaller.
The other main study finding a negative effect is that of Hanu-
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Figure 5.6: Bias in value-added estimates of the later age effects of tracking.
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authors effect
comprehensive school reform, panel data
Pekkarinen et al. (2009a) –
comprehensive school reform, cross-section
Kim et al. (2003) +
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004) +
spatial cross-section
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) –
Slavin (1990) 0
experimental
Duflo et al. (2008) +
Table 5.10: Important studies on the effect of tracking on mean test scores.
shek and Woessmann. Hanushek and Woessmann however use
a value-added specification, controlling for pre-tracking achieve-
ment. If one believes that tracking has incentive effects, this
specification is invalid, and leads to downward biased estimates
of the mean effect of tracking. They find an effect not signifi-
cantly different from zero when omitting early scores.
The other authors all find a zero or positive effect of tracking
on mean scores. I thus conclude that a zero or positive effect
of tracking on mean test scores is the most consistent with the
data.
A second implication is that a positive relationship between pre-
tracking scores and tracking policies cannot be used as an ar-
gument that there is selection in post-tracking regressions (e.g.
Manning and Pischke 2006). Since there is no reason to assume
that early test scores are exogenous, this kind of placebo test is
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not informative of selection problems.
Tracking should be expected to change the level of competitive-
ness in early education. This can make tracking relevant as a
policy tool to regulate the level of incentives. We may feel that
incentives are too small in some cases, for example if the labor
market returns to effort are much lower than societal returns.
This can be the case if income taxes are strongly progressive.
In such cases we may want to start tracking at an earlier age in
order to increase student competitiveness.
At other times, we may feel that incentives are too strong at
too young an age for student well-being. In such cases we may
want to postpone tracking in order to lower the burden on young
students.
Of course, tracking does not only change incentives, but also
actual learning dynamics during the tracked years and possibly
beyond. If we are considering to track at an earlier age than is
done today in any given country, we may want to combine such
a policy change with other measures, for example to increase
track mobility (cf. section 4.2).
It would be interesting to look at how persistent early age in-
centive effects are throughout the student career. Incentive ef-
fects are however hard to disentangle empirically from the ef-
fects of the reforms themselves. What would be needed is a
data set spanning a reform in which some students expected to
be tracked, but were not. I am not currently aware of such data.
115
116
Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
Comprehensive schooling has an equalizing effect on educational
outcomes. Because the associated loss of efficiency seems rela-
tively small and uncertain, there are strong egalitarian argu-
ments in favor of comprehensive middle schools. On the other
hand, there are classical liberal and meritocratic arguments in
favor of tracking. Students should be allowed to apply to the
schools they want to, and schools should be allowed to select
among their applicants in a transparent and meritocratic way.
The choice between egalitarianism and meritocracy can be a
false one when it comes to educational segregation. Because
the incentive for good students to attend the same school is so
large, egalitarian late-tracking policies should be expected to fail
except in heavily regulated or sparsely populated places.
In a second-best world where egalitarian policies are politically
117
impossible, we may instead want to combine a transparent and
meritocratic early tracking system with other policies that in-
crease intergenerational mobility and reduce inequality.
When considering tracking policies, it should be remembered
that tracking is a multidimensional phenomenon. The advan-
tages and disadvantages of tracking may not be proportionately
distributed over all dimensions, and different combinations of
tracking policies can have non-additive effects. It could for ex-
ample be the case that we would like to have horizontal track-
ing, but not vertical, or that we would like to have early vertical
tracking in combination with a mechanism that facilitates easy
transitions between tracks.
In a similar fashion, incentives may be changed in other ways
than through tracking. In fact, the prominence of international
educational surveys such as PISA and TIMSS in the public
debate may lead to an international shift towards educational
policies that stresses individual, class and school level scores on
testable subjects. This makes it even more important for both
policy makers and policy evaluators to understand what such
scores can and can not tell us.
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Svensk
sammanfattning
Centrala teman i denna avhandling a¨r parallellskolesystem, lin-
jedelning och segregering i ho¨gstadier och gymnasier. Det finns
stora skillnader mellan la¨nder ga¨llande den a˚rskurs d˚a elever-
na sorteras in i olika niv˚aer genom skilda klasser eller skolor.
I Tyskland och Nederla¨nderna till exempel delas eleverna upp
fo¨re ho¨gstadiet medan Sverige och Finland har enhetsskolor p˚a
ho¨gstadieniv˚a.
Skillnaderna finns inte bara mellan la¨nder, men ocks˚a inom la¨n-
der o¨ver tid. La¨nderna som har enhetsskolor idag har ofta info¨rt
dem i en serie av grundskolereformer p˚a 50-, 60- och 70-talet.
Dessa reformer go¨r det la¨ttare att studera parallellskolesyste-
mets effekter.
I denna avhandling argumenterar jag att parallellskolesystem
har en positiv effekt p˚a elevernas testresultat i a˚rskurserna fo¨-
re linjedelningen. Eleverna har incitament att jobba h˚ardare fo¨r
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att komma p˚a i den akademiska linjen (den tidigare realsko-
lan). Jag underso¨ker incitamentseffekter empiriskt, och hittar
mo¨nster konsistenta med incitamentseffekter b˚ade i brittisk och
i internationell data.
Det andra bidraget i avhandlingen a¨r metodologiskt. Nationa-
lekonomer brukar behandla testresultat fr˚an t.ex. IQ-tester el-
ler internationella PISA-underso¨kningar som kardinala. Testre-
sultat a¨r dock fundamentalt ordinala, och kardinala statistiska
operationer s˚asom nationella genomsnitt beho¨ver varken vara
meningsfulla eller robusta.
Jag visar att normalfo¨rdelade testresultat ligger tillra¨ckligt na¨-
ra dess pengava¨rde p˚a arbetsmarknaden fo¨r att kunna tolkas
som kardinala. I vissa fall a¨r fo¨rdelningarna av testresultat dock
mycket sneda, och d˚a kan det vara bra att transformera testre-
sultaten fo¨re man anva¨nder dem.
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